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INTRODUCTION

History has again become an important component of the Supreme Court's
Fourth Amendment analysis. The Court's early search and seizure precedents
often looked to the history of the Fourth Amendment for guidance. From the

late nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century, history had a
significant influence on the Justices' view of the scope and meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.1 But things changed in the 1960's, and for the next two
. Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I want to thank Yale
Kamisar for
reading an earlier draft of this article. I also owe special thanks to Wayne LaFave for his
comments on an earlier draft. His comments and critique were especially helpful. Finally, I
thank Jill Marr, Alyssa Slater and Jenna Sternberg for their research assistance.
I See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L.
REv. 1739, 1740-41 (2000) [hereinafter, Sklansky, Common Law]. In his discussion of the
early importance of history to Fourth Amendment analysis, Professor Sklansky points to the
influence of history in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Justice Brandeis's use of
history in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
and Justice Frankfurter's many arguments on the relevance of history to search and seizure
disputes. E.g., Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363-366 (1959) ("The history of the
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decades, history rarely affected the Justices' search and seizure analysis.2
Recently, however, history has made a comeback-albeit a sporadic one.
Three years ago, a majority of the Court announced in Wyoming v.
Houghton3 that a historical inquiry is the starting point for every Fourth
Amendment case. The Court explained that in determining whether a
challenged police intrusion violates the Fourth Amendment, it will "inquire
first whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under
the common law when the Amendment was framed." 4 If the common law
"yields no answer," the Court will then determine the legality of the intrusion
under a modem balancing test. 5 Although Houghton committed the Court to
relying on history in its interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, it was not
long before the Court silently reneged on this commitment. In the last two
6
Terms, the Court has decided the merits of eleven Fourth Amendment cases.
In only one of these cases, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,7 did the Court
consider the history of the Fourth Amendment at any length. In each of the
other cases decided on the merits, the Court ignored the history of the Fourth
Amendment or considered it unimportant. As this article will demonstrate, the
fact that the Court decided those ten search and seizure cases without reference
to history is not surprising. I will show that the current Justices' consideration
of history in Fourth Amendment cases has neither been predictable nor
consistent. 8 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment cases of the last two Terms merit
attention both because of what the Justices say about history and because of
what they do not say.
Part I of this Article discusses the Rehnquist Court's most recent pre-2000
Term Fourth Amendment cases that employed a historical analysis. This
section will reveal deep divisions among the Justices concerning the impact
history should have on modem Fourth Amendment doctrine. These cases not
only demonstrate that the Justices consult the history of the Amendment on a
constitutional protection against official invasion of the citizen's home makes explicit the
human concerns which it was meant to respect.").
2 See Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1741 ("[B]y the early 1970s the history of
the Fourth Amendment seemed increasingly beside the point."). On history's relevance to
Fourth Amendment analysis, Professor Amsterdam has concluded that "history is a standoff:
there is certainly nothing in it to suggest, let alone require, a narrow or static view of the
fourth amendment's broad language." Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 401 (1974).
3 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
4 Id. at 299.
5 Id. at 299-300.
6 For a complete list of these cases, see infra note 148.
7 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
8 Of course, one might argue that by deciding ten out of eleven cases without discussing
historical concerns, the Court has been predictable and consistent, to wit: they usually will
not consider history. This argument, however, conflicts with Houghton's command that
history be the starting point for every case.
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selective basis, but also indicate that a majority of the Court had not yet
reached a consensus on the determinative quality of historical considerations.
Finally, this section demonstrates that the Court had not resolved an important
threshold question: Should a historical inquiry be limited to identifying which
specific types of searches and seizures were deemed unreasonable in 1791, or
should history be used more generally to identify the values or norms that
motivated the Framers to include the Fourth Amendment in the Constitution?
Part II of the article discusses the Fourth Amendment cases decided in the
last two Terms in which it might have been appropriate for history to influence
the Justices' thinking. The Court, however, chose not to consider the historical
roots of the Amendment in these cases. Thus, this section shows that the Court
still has not developed a principled basis for deciding when history matters to
the resolution of a Fourth Amendment dispute.
Part III analyzes Atwater, the only case in the past two Terms to extensively
consider the history of the Amendment. 9 Atwater's historical analysis is
significant for several reasons. In particular, Atwater resolves a crucial
question regarding the scope of a historical inquiry by establishing that such an
inquiry should be restricted to identifying the specific types of searches and
seizures considered unreasonable in 1791.10 In other words, history matters
only when particular evidence of the Framers' intent directly addresses the
specific issue before the Court. Under Atwater, historical evidence that
identifies broad values important to the Framers' decision to adopt the Fourth
Amendment is therefore unimportant. This section of the article contends that
if Atwater's approach to Fourth Amendment historical analysis becomes the
norm for future search and seizure cases, the beneficial purposes of a historical
inquiry will be lost.
The thesis of this Article is that the Court's use of history in Fourth
Amendment cases has been unpredictable and inconsistent. Consequently, the
Article proposes that the Court stop considering the historical origins of the
Fourth Amendment unless it is able to develop a more effective and consistent
method by which to do so. Concededly, history rarely controls the result in
search and seizure cases. As in other areas of constitutional law, "originalism
does not describe the actual practice of the Supreme Court"' when it resolves
Fourth Amendment disputes. That reality, however, has not stopped the Court
I Professor Thomas Davies has written a comprehensive critique of Atwater's historical
analysis. Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Characterof Law-And-Order Originalism:A
Case Study of the Distortions and Evasions Of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v.

Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 239 (2002) [hereinafter, Davies, Law-And-Order
Originalism]. Professor Davies' historical research in this article and in an earlier article,

Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REv. 547
(1999) [hereinafter, Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment], is meticulous

and

exceedingly impressive. His research, along with the research of other scholars cited below,

has greatly assisted my thinking on the Court's use of history in criminal procedure cases.
10See 532 U.S. at 339-40.
11 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13 (2001).
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from suggesting that history does matter when deciding the meaning and scope
of the Fourth Amendment.
The dilemma for lawyers and scholars is
determining when history affects the Court's judgment. Although history can
12
provide significant insights into the Framers' thinking about the Amendment,
the Court's current use of Fourth Amendment history neither accurately
reflects the Framers' "underlying vision" 13 of the Amendment nor provides a
useful methodology for deciding modem search and seizure cases.
Accordingly, unless the Court develops a more appropriate method for
interpreting the complexity of the Fourth Amendment's origins, it should stop
relying on history when deciding Fourth Amendment cases. It is in this sense
that this Article suggests the Court should simply let sleeping dogs lie.
I.

WHEN DOES HISTORY MATTER?

When explaining the meaning of the constitutional right against
unreasonable search or seizure, it is tempting to consider the history
surrounding the origins of the Fourth Amendment. "The Fourth Amendment
provides us with a rich historical background rooted in American, as well as
English, experience; it is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that
grew directly out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary
struggle with England."'1 4 This fact partially explains the lure of history. But
historical inquiries are attractive for other reasons, as well. The Justices want
12In other forums, I have argued that history can assist the Court's interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment. See Tracey Maclin, The Complexity of the Fourth Amendment: A
Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 974 (1997) [hereinafter Maclin, Complexity]
(arguing that "the history of the Fourth Amendment is vast, important to modem-day
analysis, and cannot be reduced to simplistic legal theory"); Tracey Maclin, When the Cure
for the Fourth Amendment is Worse than the Disease, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 13 (1994)
[hereinafter Maclin, Worse than the Disease] (contending that "historical analysis and
constitutional originalism are helpful tools when they instruct us on the broad principles that
motivated the Framers"); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 229 (1993) [hereinafter Maclin, Central Meaning] (asserting
from the "historical evidence" that the "broad principle embodied in the Reasonableness
Clause is that discretionary police power implicating Fourth Amendment interests cannot be
trusted").
13 The phrase "underlying vision" comes from Professor Laurence Tribe. See LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 537 (2d ed. 1988). In describing the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2, Professor Tribe writes that:
[T]he underlying vision of the framers-that the states not war with one another by
discriminating against one another's citizens without good reason-should nonetheless
be regarded as giving rise to the dominant meaning of the clause even if the framers
themselves may have had a more limited set of examples in mind.
Id. In the latest edition of his constitutional treatise, Professor Tribe slightly altered this
passage. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1261 (3d ed. 2000)
(using the phrase "the vision underlying the constitutional plan").
14 JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

19 (1966).
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their rulings to appear politically neutral. Like a textual approach to
constitutional decision-making, defining the scope of a constitutional right
according to the "original intent" of the Framers provides a cloak of objectivity
for the Court's rulings. When the Court issues unpopular or controversial
rulings that are not sufficiently steeped in constitutional text or history, critics
are quick to accuse the judiciary of being too political.1 s Deciding Fourth
Amendment issues according to the Framers' "original intent" thus gives the
16
Court's rulings an appearance of neutrality and inevitability.
Professor David Sklansky recently asserted that historical concerns exert a
"strong gravitational pull" on the Court's current search and seizure
jurisprudence,' 7 Unfortunately, the Court's recent cases provide scant
guidance on when or why history makes a difference in the Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. Speaking generally, a unanimous
Court recently explained that when determining the meaning or scope of the
Amendment, it may examine "the traditional protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the
framing."' 18 This seemingly straightforward formulation, however, leaves
several important questions unanswered. For example, which category of
Fourth Amendment cases calls for a historical inquiry? In one case, the Court
might devote a substantial part of its analysis to a discussion on eighteenth
century federal statutes, despite the questionable relevance of those laws to the
issue at hand.' 9 In another case, however, there might be no discussion of the
11 As David Strauss notes, "[a]n air of illegitimacy surrounds any alleged departure from
the text or the original understandings." David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation,63 U. CHIC. L. REv. 877, 878 (1996).
16 See Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1811 ("The new Fourth Amendment
originalism works similarly, cloaking questions of fairness and expediency as historical
inquiries into eighteenth-century common law."); Strauss, supra note 15, at 928. According
to Professor Strauss:
Approaches that emphasize the text or the Framers' intentions ... ordinarily insist on
the supposed absolute priority of the text or the Framers' intentions over the judge's
moral views. Those approaches have a tendency to suggest that it is a usurpation for a
judge ever to consider the fairness or justice of the action she is being asked to take
... .Disputes that in fact concern matters of morality or policy masquerade as
hermeneutic disputes about the 'meaning' of the text, or historians' disputes about what
the Framers did.
Id. (footnote omitted); cf TRIBE, supra note 13, § 1-14, at 52 ("To the degree that original
meaning would at least establish a baseline and create a presumption to be overcome, its
gravitational pull remains undeniable.").
7 Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1774.
IS See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995).
In Wilson, Justice Thomas
explained that although "reasonableness" is the touchstone for Fourth Amendment analysis,
the reasonableness of a challenged search or seizure "may be guided by the meaning
ascribed to it by the Framers of the Amendment." Id.
19See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). Houghton ruled that a search
of an automobile passenger's purse was valid even though the police had no reason to
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Fourth Amendment's history, even though the challenged police intrusion
20
implicates a constitutional interest at the forefront of the Framers' thinking.
Finally, historical comparisons are conspicuously absent in a third type of case
that involves police intrusions that, while not specific "evils" that the Framers
contemplated, nonetheless undermine
the more general purposes and values
21
the Framers sought to promote.
believe that the purse contained drugs. The Court explained that if the police have probable
cause to believe that narcotics are present in a car, officers have the discretion to search all
containers in the car capable of holding the narcotics. In reaching this holding, the Court
relied upon late-eighteenth century federal statutes that authorized customs officers to
inspect ships that entered American ports. See id. at 300-02.
20 See, e.g., Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001). McArthur ruled that a warrantless
seizure of a home was permissible where there was probable cause that the homeowner had
hidden marijuana inside. Although this police intrusion interfered with McArthur's use of
his home, the Court did not inquire whether the Fourth Amendment's history was relevant
to the legality of the seizure. This omission is curious since there is universal agreement
that security of private homes was the primary concern of the Framers when they adopted
the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001)
(emphasizing that "'[a]t the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home."' (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961))); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (noting "the overriding respect for
the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the
Republic"). This Term, in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001), the Court upheld
a warrantless, investigatory search of a probationer's home based on reasonable suspicion of
criminality. Again, the Court ignored the history of the Amendment, even though banning
searches of homes pursuant to the discretionary decisions of law enforcement officers was
an important goal of the Framers.
21 The Framers, of course, never considered the constitutionality of traffic seizures.
There are, however, sound reasons to believe that the "larger purpose for which the Framers
adopted the [Fourth Amendment was] to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by
[police] officers." Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at
556; see also Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 411-12 (asserting that searches and seizures
conducted at the discretion of executive officials motivated the Framers' thinking about the
Fourth Amendment); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did)(Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a
"PrincipledBasis" Rather than an "EmpiricalProposition"?,16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565,
575 (1983) ("1 think it fair to say that the colonists condemned writs of assistance because
such writs 'no more controlled official discretion than would a statute that simply permitted
warrantless searches."' (citation omitted)); Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 12, at 228.
As I have pointed out previously, history makes clear that "[e]ighteenth century Americans
who fought against British customs officers expected more from constitutional principles
than a simple utterance that judges defer to rational and pragmatic search and seizure
practices. They demanded that discretionary search and seizure powers be restrained." Id.
Despite the Framers' concern about checking unfettered law enforcement discretion, the
Court has upheld the power of the police to effect pretextual arrests and pretextual stops for
traffic offenses. See Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771-72 (2001) (per curiam)
(upholding pretextual arrest for traffic offenses based on probable cause, and finding that
officers' subjective motives are irrelevant); Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814-15
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The Court's professed willingness/to examine the Framers' understanding of
unreasonable searches and seizures also masks fundamental differences in the
way the Justices consult or consider the historical origins of the Fourth
Amendment. As a threshold matter, it is unclear whether historical sources
matter only when common-law rules or the Framers' "original understanding"
directly address the precise issue currently before the Court, or whether
historical sources are considered by the Justices to measure "the general thrust
of the Amendment, not its detailed applications. '22 In the years leading up to
the 2000 Term, the Justices had taken opposing stands on this fundamental
inquiry regarding the role of history in Fourth Amendment adjudication.
The Court's precedents also provide negligible guidance on how much
weight the Court accords to the history of the Amendment. Do historical
considerations trump other factors when deciding the constitutionality of a
police intrusion? Or, conversely, are common-law rules cited for their
rhetorical appeal, and not because they control the outcome of a case? 23 If, as
(1996) (ruling unanimously that an officer's subjective intent is irrelevant to the
constitutional validity of a traffic stop). A few of the Justices have belatedly recognized
what many commentators already knew about Whren: Police now have nearly unfettered
discretion to stop (and possibly arrest) any motorist who commits a traffic offense. See,
e.g., Atwater, 532 U.S. at 372 (2001) (O'Connor, J.,dissenting) (acknowledging the
discretionary authority of police regarding the enforcement of traffic offenses given by
Whren, and noting that the Court has now given officers "unfettered discretion to choose [to
stop, search and arrest a motorist for a traffic offense] without articulating a single reason
why such action is appropriate"). This Term, the Court again rebuffed the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit's effort to provide guidance and clear rules on when police officers
could exercise their discretion to conduct investigative seizures. In United States v. Arvizu,
122 S. Ct. 744 (2002), the Court rejected the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's fear
that a fact-specific weighing of circumstances injected "'a troubling degree of uncertainty
and unpredictability' into investigative seizure cases. Id. at 751 (quoting 232 F.3d 1241,
1248 (9th Cir. 2000)). Arvizu reaffirmed that the reasonable suspicion standard permits
consideration of almost any factor deemed suspicious by a police officer, however
innocuous or commonplace. Arvizu was a replay of a similar effort by the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit to curb discretionary police power to seize persons suspected of being
drug couriers. See United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a
reasonable suspicion test must be founded upon evidence of ongoing criminal behavior, and
that probabilistic evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy reasonable suspicion),
rev'd, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989) ("We think the Court of Appeals' effort to refine and elaborate
the requirements of 'reasonable suspicion' in this case create unnecessary difficulty in
dealing with one of the relatively simple concepts embodied in the Fourth Amendment.").
22 Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1764.
23 Professor Sklansky nicely describes the rhetorical appeal history provides for the
Justices:
[W]hatever its limitations as theory, the new Fourth Amendment originalism has
distinct strengths as rhetoric. Even in cases where it does not affect results, it can help
to legitimize them. All varieties of constitutional originalism do this, by attributing
outcomes not to unelected judges but to the collective determination of an older and
particularly revered generation. But the new Fourth Amendment originalism goes one
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is likely, the Justices have not definitively resolved history's role in search and
seizure doctrine, when do modem considerations compel the Justices to ignore
eighteenth-century legal rules when adjudicating current Fourth Amendment
claims?

24

The Court's modem cases do not provide answers to these

questions. In fact, the recent cases prior to the 2000 Term raise several
questions on the role history plays in the Court's search and seizure
jurisprudence.

better, by appealing not just to the wisdom of the Framers, but to the wisdom of the
ages.
Id. at 1772.
24 See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (noting that "though the common
law pedigree of Tennessee's [use of deadly force on a fleeing felon] rule is pure on its face,
changes in the legal and technological context mean the rule is distorted almost beyond
recognition when literally applied"). For example, the result in United States v. Knights,
534 U.S. 112 (2001), was clearly driven by modem law-enforcement concerns. The
historical considerations concerning the sanctity of private homes were not discussed. See
supra note 20. From a historical perspective, it is not obvious that the result in Knights is
consistent with the Framers' understanding of the Fourth Amendment. Of course, it must be
remembered that the modem concept of probation was unknown in 1791. But cf DAVID
DRESSLER, PRACTICE AND THEORY OF PROBATION AND PAROLE 20 (1951) ("Historians
usually call [probation] an origination of the United States, and it is, despite the fact that
some of its antecedents may be traced back to British common law."). Consider also the
Knights ruling in light of the following passage on the legal origins of probation:
Several attempts have been made to trace back the legal origins of probation to
mediaeval and early modem European law. The precedents found in this period of
legal history, however, generally related to the suspension of punishment subject to
good behavior rather than to probation as such, that is, a combination of the conditional
suspension of punishment and the personal supervision of the released offender during
a trial period.
PROBATION AND PAROLE: SELECTED READINGS 4 (Robert M. Carter & Leslie T. Wilkins eds.,
1970); see also id. at 11 (noting that "during the first half of the nineteenth century,
Massachusetts judges sought diligently and in a variety of ways to render the administration
of justice more humane, and a favorable judicial climate was thus established for the
development of rudimentary 'probation' practices"). Thus, although it seems clear our
modem conceptions of probation may not have been familiar to the Framers, we
nevertheless know that they opposed warrantless searches of private homes. See Davies,
Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 576-83. As Professor Davies
points out:
The historical evidence also demonstrates that the Framers believed that the orderly
and formal processes associated with specific warrants, including judicial assessment
of whether there was adequate cause for the intrusion, provided the best means of
preventing violations of the security of person or house. In particular, the Framers
thought that magistrates were more capable than ordinary officers of making sound
decisions as to whether a search was justified.
Id. at 577 (footnote omitted).
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Cases Priorto the 2000 Term: No Consensus on the Relevance of History
for FourthAmendment Cases

For the practitioner or scholar who studies the Court's Fourth Amendment
doctrine, determining when history matters can be an elusive task. Wilson v.
Arkansas25 is often cited as an exemplar of the Rehnquist Court's use of
history to define the meaning and scope of the Fourth Amendment. Indeed,
historical considerations clearly affected the result in that case, but Wilson's
treatment of history raises as many questions as it answers.
At issue in Wilson was whether the so-called "knock and announce" rule of
the common law is constitutionally mandated under the Fourth Amendment.
According to Justice Thomas' unanimous opinion, the common law
"recognized a law enforcement officer's authority to break open the doors of a
dwelling, but generally indicated that he first ought to announce his presence
and authority. 26 Wilson held that "the common-law 'knock and announce'
principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
27
Amendment."
Wilson appears to be a straightforward and uncontroversial use of history to
interpret the Framers' intentions regarding the Fourth Amendment. An
examination of the history surrounding the origins and development of the
Amendment convinced the Court that "the reasonableness of a search of a
dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced
their presence and authority prior to entering. '2 8 Justice Thomas analyzed preFraming era English cases, "prominent founding-era commentators," 29 and
early American statutes, all of which acknowledged that the announcement
rule was fundamental to protecting the privacy and physical security of the
home. 30
Based on this "longstanding endorsement of the practice of
announcement,"'" Justice Thomas was confident "that the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry into a
dwelling was among the factors to be considered in assessing the
reasonableness of a search or seizure. 32
Justice Thomas was equally certain, however, that the Amendment's
"flexible requirement of reasonableness" did not "mandate a rigid rule of
announcement that ignores countervailing law enforcement interests. 33 He
explained that "the common-law principle of announcement was never stated

25 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
26

Id. at 929.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 931.
932.

29 Id. at

Id. at 931-34.
31Id. at 934.
30

32 Id.

33Id.
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as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances. 34
Justice Thomas also noted that post-Framing era cases have relaxed the
announcement rule in several circumstances, including "where police officers
have reason to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance
notice were given. '35 Therefore, Wilson ultimately held that "although a
search or seizure of a dwelling might be constitutionally defective if police
officers enter without prior announcement, law enforcement interests may also
36
establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry.
Because Wilson was a unanimous ruling, and because Justice Thomas'
opinion focused exclusively on historical sources, Wilson may be seen as a
paradigm of how history influences the Justices' thinking on Fourth
Amendment issues. Still, Wilson's use of history raises a few irksome
questions. First, the Court's description of the common-law rule is curious.
Under the common law, the announcement rule had two interlocking
components: First, an officer had to knock and announce his presence and
purpose; second, forcible entry was barred until the officer's request for entry
was refused. 37 At key places in his opinion, Justice Thomas omits the second
34 Id.
35 Id.

at 936 (citations omitted).

36 Id.

37 See 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN *582 (explaining
that with a warrant, "the officer may break open the door, if he be sure the offender is there,
if after acquainting them of the business, and demanding the prisoner, he refuses to open the
door") (emphasis added); id. at *588-589 (discussing times where a "person without a
warrant may arrest and break open doors to arrest if they within refuse to open them upon
demand"); Mass. Acts and Laws 1782-83, at 86-87 (May 7, 1777) (noting that
Massachusetts law governing the issuance of search warrants to discover contraband
permitted forcible entry "if Admittance be refused or cannot be obtained") (emphasis
added); N.Y. St. sess. 5, ch. 39, § 3 (April 13, 1782, N.Y. State Laws, vol.1 (1777-84)), p.
480 (illustrating that New York statutes permitted constables possessing search warrants "to
break open the doors of any house or outhouse, for the purpose of making any [contraband]
search, if admittance shall be refused") (emphasis added); William Cuddihy, The Fourth
Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 1512-13 (1990) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with the Boston University School of Law
Library) (citing the pre-Constitution "statutes and legal manuals of at least seven states
[that] permitted forcible entry only after a householder had refused to admit a searcher under
circumstances that included smuggling, counterfeiting, and trading with the enemy"
(citation omitted)).
Contemporary commentators still include the refusal element in their descriptions of the
requirements of the notice rule. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 4.8 (a), at
608 (3d ed. 1996) (asserting that "[i]t is not enough, of course, that the police gave the
necessary announcement prior to entry; they must first have been refused admittance");
Kemal Alexander Mericli, The Apprehension of Peril Exception to the Knock and Announce
Rule-Part 1, 16 SEARCH AND SEIZURE L. REPORT 129, 131 (July 1989) (noting that the rule
requires police "to notify the occupants of the dwelling of his presence, his identity as a
police officer and his specific legal purpose for requesting entry and to wait a reasonable
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part of the rule, and describes the rule as only requiring an officer to announce
his presence and authority. 38 This is not a trivial omission.

According to pre-Framing era English common-law sources, the
announcement rule served three purposes: it decreased the potential for
violence; it protected a home's privacy; and it prevented the physical
destruction of the home. 39 Preventing a forcible police entry until admittance
was refused-the second component of the common-law rule-directly
advanced a homeowner's interest in not having his property destroyed
unnecessarily. As Semayne's Case40 recognized in 1603, notice and refusal of
admittance were prerequisites to a forcible entry because
the law without a default in the owner abhors the destruction or breaking
of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man) by which
great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no
default is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process,
of which, if
41
he had notice, it is to be presumed that he would obey it.
In addition to this normative concern, requiring notice and refusal of
admittance prior to a forcible entry addressed practical concerns. As one
writer has noted:
In seventeenth century England, doors and window shutters could not be
easily replaced, and, if damaged, they could not shield the homeowner
from the severe dangers outside. A request for entrance by an official
obviously gave the property owner the opportunity to prevent his bulwark
42
of safety from being destroyed.
In sum, the dual components of the announcement rule, notice and refusal of
admittance prior to forcible entry, served both normative and practical interests

time to allow the occupants to admit him voluntarily or to refuse to do so before entering the
dwelling forcibly").
38 See Wilson, 514 U.S. at 929 (contending that "the common law of search and seizure
recognized a law enforcement officer's authority to break open the doors of a dwelling, but
generally indicated that he first ought to announce his presence and authority") (emphasis
added); id. at 934 (holding "that in some circumstances an officer's unannounced entry into
a home might be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment") (emphasis added); id. at 936
(noting that the Court "simply hold[s] that although a search or seizure of a dwelling might
be constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior announcement, law
enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry")
(emphasis added).
39Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 140-42 (1970) (citing
English cases illustrating these three purposes); see also LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 599-600
(citing twentieth century American cases articulating arguments in support of these three
purposes).
40 5 Co.Rep. 91a, 77 Eng.Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603).
41 id.at 196.
42 Note, supra note 39, at 142.
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regarding the sanctity of the home. 43
For reasons that are not explained, Wilson's holding that the common-law's
"knock and announce" principle "forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry
under the Fourth Amendment" 44 is conspicuously silent on an officer's
obligation to refrain from using force until his request for entry had been
refused. The Court's silence cannot be attributed to oversight. In his
discussion of the origins of the announcement rule, Justice Thomas quotes
passages from a 1774 ruling of the King's Bench and from Sir Matthew Hale,
both of which include statements concerning an officer's obligation not to use
45
force until his request for admittance had been denied.
Perhaps Justice Thomas withheld discussion on this point because the Court
was reluctant to acknowledge a constitutional restraint on the powers of police
that some perceive as a threat to the safety of officers. To put it mildly, law
enforcement officers and their advocates are not fans of the "knock and
announce" rule. As one prosecutor noted, "[p]olice executing a search warrant
for a 'den of drug traffickers' operate ... on the presumption that the knock
and announce rule is [more] likely to function as 'an invitation to be shot' than
a protective shield, that they will be met with a fusillade instead of
compliance. ' 46 In the eyes of the police, requiring notice and announcement of
43 See, e.g., Mericli, supra note 37, at 132 (arguing that "[t]he English judges who
created and articulated the knock and announce rule were solely concerned with preventing
the needless destruction of a dwelling-an act with potentially devastating consequences in
a preindustrial society").
44 514 U.S. at 929.
41 See id. at 932. Justice Thomas quoted Lee v. Gansell for the proposition that "'as to
the outer door, the law is now clearly taken' that it is privileged; but the door may be broken
'when the due notification and demand has been made and refused."' Wilson, 514 U.S. at
932 (quoting Lee v. Gansell, Lofft 374, 381-82, 98 Eng. Rep. 700 (K.B. 1774)). Justice
Thomas also quoted from William Hawkins' treatise: "'the law doth never allow' an officer
to break open the door of a dwelling 'but in cases of necessity,' that is, unless he 'first
signify to those in the house the cause of his coming, and request them to give him
admittance."' Id. (quoting 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, ch.14, § 1, at p.138
(6th ed. 1787)). Finally, Justice Thomas was undoubtedly familiar with the amicus curiae
brief filed by the Solicitor General's office arguing that the Arkansas Supreme Court's
ruling be affirmed. See David A. Sklansky, Traffic Stops, Minority Motorists, and the
Future of the Fourth Amendment, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 271, 305 [hereinafter, Sklansky,
Traffic Stops] (noting that "the Solicitor General's office asked the Court to hold 'that the
manner of entry in executing a search warrant is a component of the reasonableness analysis
under the Fourth Amendment and that knock and announce is a component of that
analysis,'-precisely what the Court later held" (citation omitted)). When describing the
scope of the common-law announcement rule, the Solicitor General first noted that before
entering a home, officers had to knock and announce their presence. The Solicitor General
then explained that the "common law also required that officers not enter a home forcibly
until their request to enter had been actually or constructively refused." Brief of Amicus
Curiae United States at 9, Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (citations omitted).
46 Mericli, supra note 37, at 130.
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presence and purpose makes a dangerous situation more menacing; imposing
the additional hurdle that admittance be refused prior to a forcible entry puts
officers in a life-threatening position. For the police, strict 47compliance with
the common law rule amounts to "a dangerous anachronism.
Although it is clear that some law enforcement officials currently oppose the
announcement rule, their opposition is of no consequence when determining
whether the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to incorporate all aspects
of the common-law rule. 48 Just as law enforcement concerns do not provide a
justification for Wilson's silence on the refusal component, practical and
jurisprudential reasons also seem to counsel against the Court's silence
regarding the Framers' full understanding of the notice rule. First, as a
practical matter, although the Court wrote a minimalist opinion and left to the
lower courts the task of determining how the announcement rule would operate
in diverse scenarios, 49 refusing to acknowledge an essential component of the
common-law rule leaves police officers, lawyers, and judges in the dark
regarding what actions are necessary for minimal compliance with the
announcement rule. More importantly, severing the refusal component from
the notice component defeats the purpose behind the rule. 50 The goals of the
announcement rule-minimizing the chance of violence, protecting the home's
47 Id.
48 Cf George C. Thomas Il1, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the

Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 168 (2001)

(observing that "the entire history of the debates surrounding the Bill of Rights contains not
a single reference to the importance of enabling the crime-solving function of the federal
government"); id. at 173 (asserting that "the Framers were not concerned with the
government's interest in solving crime," and that "while we today fear criminals, the
Framers feared the central government").
'9 The Court noted that "we leave to the lower courts the task of determining the
circumstances under which an unannounced entry is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment." 514 U.S. at 936. Wilson is undoubtedly a "minimalist" ruling. "Indeed, read
literally, Wilson does not even say that any violation of the common-law notice rule is also
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; the Court much more cautiously says only that

'the common-law "knock and announce" principle forms a part of the reasonableness
inquiry."' LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 600 (citation omitted); see also Robert J. Driscoll,
UnannouncedPolice Entries and Destruction of Evidence After Wilson v. Arkansas, 29
COLUM. J. LAW & SOC. PROB. 1, 4 (1995). Driscoll claims that the "Court explicitly refused
to discuss the specific circumstances that might justify an unannounced entry." Id. (citation
omitted). Although a few commentators have criticized the minimalist quality of Wilson,

there are legitimate arguments favoring minimalist Supreme Court rulings. See CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 24

(1999)

(articulating the "close connection between minimalism and democracy").
" See United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 2000) (illustrating that "[a]
court can not sever the requirement that an officer wait a reasonable time before forcing his
way into a residence from the requirement that he knock and announce his presence in the
first place," and asserting instead that "only together do these requirements serve the
interests" behind the announcement rule).
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privacy, and preventing unnecessary physical damage to the home-will not be
achieved if a homeowner is not given a reasonable opportunity to open his
front door. Both halves of the rule must be followed to achieve its
constitutional goals. 5'
Wilson's silence on the refusal component might also be attributed to the
time-honored tradition of rendering constitutional decisions upon narrow
grounds, or of refusing to decide constitutional questions not presented by the
facts. 52 Concededly, it would have been inappropriate for Wilson to discuss or
decide how much time an officer must wait before conducting a forcible entry
53
after announcing her presence, as that issue was not presented by the facts.
The facts in Wilson, however, did not affect the Court's reasoning. 54 Instead,
what was at stake was the constitutional status of the announcement rule.
Second, on a jurisprudential level, it is not obvious why the Court would
want to create doubt about the constitutional status of the refusal component
when British and American common law undeniably required refusal of
admittance prior to a forcible entry of a home. Whether intended or not, the
Court's silence could be interpreted as a signal that the refusal component
either is not constitutionally required, or is less important than the notice
component. 55 Although the lower courts have generally taken the position that
the refusal component also forms part of the reasonableness inquiry under the
51 See id. at 985 (stating that from the residents' perspective, "the mere knocking by an
officer protects no interests whatsoever if they are not given ample time to respond").
52 See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring)

(insisting that "[t]he Court will not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied" (citation omitted)).
53 The lower courts have not adopted any per se rules on how long an officer must wait
after giving notice. See LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 608-10 (discussing numerous cases).
However, the lower courts "have been unduly lenient on this [issue], holding that the police
may proceed to enter after waiting no longer than ten or twenty seconds." Id. at 608
(citations omitted). Whether refusal of entry is a constitutional requirement is one of several
issues that remains in limbo after Wilson. Indeed, "precisely what defect in or failure to
give notice constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation is a matter of continuing uncertainty
even after Wilson." LAFAVE, supra note 37, at 600.
51 Interestingly, Justice Thomas catalogued several "contrary considerations" or
"countervailing factors" that weighed against application of the announcement rule in a
particular case. 514 U.S. at 935-36. Still, the record in Wilson provided no evidentiary
basis to justify an exception to the announcement rule. The trial court did not find any
exigent circumstances or other reason justifying a "no knock" entry, and the Arkansas
Supreme Court chose not to discuss the matter. This hole in the record, however, did not
prevent Justice Thomas from discussing and incorporating these exceptions into his
holding. See id. at 936 (holding that "although a search or seizure of a dwelling might be
constitutionally defective if police officers enter without prior announcement, law
enforcement interests may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced entry").
11 Cf Dice, 200 F.3d. at 984 (describing and rejecting the government's effort to create
different categories of knock-and-announce violations and its attempt to label the police's
failure to give notice as a more severe violation than refusing to wait for admittance).
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Fourth Amendment, 6 a literal reading of the Wilson opinion permits a contrary
conclusion. If the Court was genuinely uncertain about the constitutional
status of the refusal component, then it should have left that issue open
explicitly, rather than remain silent. Silence on a fundamental aspect of the
common-law announcement rule calls into question the sincerity of the Court's
willingness to adhere to all aspects of common-law search and seizure norms.
If history is truly to act as a constraint on the Justices' policy preferences,
then the Justices should not be free to pick-and-choose those parts of the
historical record they prefer and discard those parts of which they

disapprove. 57 Although the Court was willing to require that police comply
with part of the common-law rule, at least occasionally, 58 it was unwilling to
mandate meaningful constitutional protection for the home by requiring full
compliance with the announcement rule. Why? Perhaps because that result
would, in the eyes of many, simply aid guilty persons intent on destroying
59
evidence.
See United States v. Espinoza, 256 F.3d 718, 723 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing the
condition that officers wait a reasonable period of time after knocking and announcing as a
"necessary corollary" to the notice requirement), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 905 (2002); Dice,
56

200 F.3d at 983 (remarking that "[a]n integral part of the knock-and-announce rule is the
requirement that officers wait a 'reasonable' period of time after a knock before physically
forcing their way into a residence" (citation omitted)); Mazepink v. Arkansas, 987 S.W.2d
648, 653 (1999) (expressing the view that "the Fourth Amendment not only requires officers
to go through the motions of knocking and announcing, it also requires them to wait a
reasonable period of time before forcing entry into the premises" (citation omitted)), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 927 (1999).
51 As Professor Davies has argued:
No Justice or commentator is likely to endorse a wholesale return to common-law
doctrine. For example, the common law did not authorize warrantless arrests for
felony on probable cause, but insisted on proof of "felony in fact." I doubt that anyone
will advocate returning to a common-law doctrine that was later judged inadequate for
effective policing. Yet, if common law is not embraced entirely, the choice of which
pieces to embrace may come down to little more than personal preference.

Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, supra note 9, at 743.
58 Professor Sklansky states that Wilson was "a government victory in all but name."
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, supra note 45, at 303. He concludes that the case was "[niot a
meaningful expansion of Fourth Amendment protections" because "[w]hat the Court held,
essentially, is that a 'no knock' search is 'unreasonable' under the Fourth Amendment when
it is unreasonable not to knock. This is hardly a resounding blow for civil liberties." Id. at
305 (citation omitted). Although I agree with Professor Sklansky's sentiments that Wilson's
holding is unlikely to provide significant protection because it will be easy for judges to find
that an unannounced police entry was "reasonable" under the circumstances, Professor
Sklansky's description of Wilson as "a government victory" is a tad extreme. A real victory
for the government would have been a holding that the announcement rule is not
constitutionally required, which was the conclusion of the Arkansas Supreme Court below.
See 878 S.W.2d 755, 758 (1994), reversed, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). A little bit of
constitutional protection is better than no protection.
59 Prior to Wilson, courts and commentators questioned whether the announcement rule
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Wilson's use of history is also troublesome because of the Court's penchant
to mix historical principles with modem concepts. In the case of Wilson and
its progeny, this practice has produced search and seizure norms that are
neither grounded in history nor reflective of the Framers' purposes. In Wilson,
Justice Thomas insisted that the common-law announcement rule was
consistent with the modem view that the ultimate command of the Fourth
Amendment is that all searches and seizures be reasonable. According to
Justice Thomas, the common law did not require that every police entry of a
home comply with the "knock and announce" rule. 60 After noting the
compatibility of the common-law notice rule and the modem concept of
reasonableness, Justice Thomas explained that the common law recognized
exceptions to the rule which promoted legitimate law enforcement interests.
He opined that "the presumption in favor of announcement" could be ignored
in cases involving "a threat of physical violence," where "a prisoner escapes
from [an officer] and retreats to his dwelling," and where police "have reason
to believe that evidence would likely be destroyed if advance notice were
'61
given.
Wilson demonstrates the selective way the Court uses history to decide

promoted legitimate privacy concerns. See, e.g., G. Robert Blakey, The Rule of
Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and Ker v. California, 112 U.
PENN. L. REv. 499, 557 (1964) (asserting that "the real issue in the announcement situation
is solely the traditional question of force," and that "[b]ringing in the amorphous concept of
privacy merely confuses the problem"); Michael R. Sonnenreich & Stanley Ebner, NoKnock and Nonsense, an Alleged ConstitutionalProblem, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 626, 647
(1970) (arguing that "[i]t is difficult to see ... what actual protection is given to any right of
privacy by the announcement rule"). One court even stated that the announcement rule
advances no legitimate constitutional interests and "benefit[s] the guilty alone." State v.
Smith, 181 A.2d 761, 770-71 (N.J. 1962) (concluding that unannounced search and seizure
is permissible when announcement would jeopardize the state interest). A recent, albeit
more subtle, manifestation ofthe view that the announcement rule only "benefits the guilty"
is evident where prosecutors argue that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable where police
violate the refusal component of the announcement rule. Compare People v. Stevens, 597
N.W.2d 53, 62 (1999) (accepting prosecutor's argument that, although police waited only
eleven seconds after announcing their presence before conducting a forcible midnight entry,
the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because "the evidence would have been discovered
despite any police misconduct") with United States v. Dice, 200 F.3d at 984-86 (rejecting
the government's "categorization of knock-and-announce violations into different degrees
of severity meriting different remedies," and noting that "remov[ing] the exclusionary bar
from this type of knock-and-announce violation whenever officers possess a valid warrant
would in one swift move gut the constitution's regulation of how officers execute such
warrants").
60 514 U.S. at 934 ("The Fourth Amendment's flexible requirement of reasonableness
should not be read to mandate a rigid rule of announcement that ignores countervailing law
enforcement interests.").
61Id. at 936 (citations omitted).
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Fourth Amendment disputes. 62 First, Justice Thomas asserts that "the
common-law principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule
requiring announcement under all circumstances. '63 This statement suggests
that the common law recognized exceptions to the notice requirement. A
careful analysis of the different parts of the common law prior to 1791,
64
however, indicates that exceptions to the notice rule were "severely limited"

and not nearly as numerous as Wilson suggests.
For example, prior to the adoption of the Fourth Amendment, the English
judiciary did not recognize any exceptions to the "knock and announce" rule,65
62

See generally Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searchingfor History, 63

U. CHic. L. REV. 1707-08 (1996) (book review) (articulating that "[l]awyers' histories of the
Fourth Amendment have been partial in two ways: they have been incomplete, reviewing
only a small fraction of the relevant historical data, and they have been partisan, selectively
deploying fragments of the historical record to support their arguments about the
Amendment's meaning").
63 514 U.S. at 934.
64 Note, Announcement in Police Entries, supra note 39, at 143.
65 See, e.g., Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 54 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (declaring
that "I have found no English decision which clearly recognizes any exception to the
requirement that the police first give notice of their authority and purpose before forcibly
entering a home"); Jennifer M. Goddard, Note, The Destruction of Evidence Exception to
the Knock and Announce Rule: A Callfor Protection of Fourth Amendment Rights, 75 B.U.
L. REV. 449, 460 (1995) (stating that "[a]lthough the English judiciary did not formulate any
categorical exceptions to the knock and announce rule, courts did indicate a reluctance to
apply the rule to arrests of alleged felons"). Professor Blakey, who has written an extensive
article on the announcement rule, does not identify any case prior to the adoption of the
Fourth Amendment in which the judiciary excused the notice requirement. Blakey does,
however, identify nineteenth century cases where the notice requirement "was not
mechanically applied." Blakey, supra note 59, at 505 (citing cases). Another commentator
has suggested that "the absence of complaints about silent entries by victims of [search
warrants], who were quick to criticize other aspects of the warrants, strongly implies that
announcement was given." Note, Announcement in Police Entries, supra note 39, at 143
n.20.
In Wilson, Justice Thomas cites only one pre-1791 case supporting the assertion that "the
common-law principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring
announcement under all circumstances." 514 U.S. at 934. For this proposition, he cites
White & Wiltsheire, 2 Rolle 137, 81 Eng. Rep. 709, 710 (K.B. 1619), as "upholding the
sheriffs breaking of the door of the plaintiffs dwelling after the sheriff's bailiffs had been
imprisoned in plaintiffs dwelling while they attempted an earlier execution of the seizure."
514 U.S. at 935. In White & Wiltsheire, the defendant, an undersheriff, sent two bailiffs to
satisfy a civil writ against the plaintiff. The bailiffs entered an open door, at which time the
plaintiff imprisoned them for over two hours. After discovering the imprisonment, the
undersheriff broke open the plaintiff's door to free his bailiffs. Based on these facts, Justice
Thomas suggests that White & Wiltsheire supports the proposition that the notice
requirement was never stated as an inflexible rule. The notice requirement, however, was
not at issue in White & Wiltsheire. The King's Bench decided that the undersheriff's
breaking of the door and entry of the home to free his bailiffs was justified, but only because

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 82:895

and prominent Founding-era legal scholars likewise did not recognize
exceptions to the notice rule. 66 Indeed, Sir Michael Foster wrote that "[i]n
every case where doors may be broken open in order to arrest, whether in cases
criminal or civil, there must be notification, demand, and refusal, before the
parties concerned proceed to that extremity. ' '67 Finally, in England "[e]fforts
to legislate no-knock authorization were repeatedly resisted in the eighteenth
century, despite the fact that such powers were proposed as a means of
increasing police effectiveness. ' 68 Even the dreaded writs of assistance
permitted forcible entry and search only when British customs officers faced
resistance to their authority, "a condition that strongly implies that some type
'69
of identification was given."
Furthermore, there is no evidence from the time the Fourth Amendment was
proposed and adopted suggesting the Framers' experience on American soil
included exceptions to the notice rule. "American colonial experience with
announcement prior to entrance was parallel to England's: execution of all
warrants was made with notice. There are no reported cases in America before

the plaintiff had necessitated the intrusion. As one commentator described, White &
Wiltsheire was a decision "involving an unusual factual setting." Driscoll, supra note 49, at
26-27. In light of this atypical fact pattern and the narrow ruling of the King's Bench, White
& Wiltsheire is a thin reed upon which to rest Justice Thomas' conclusion that the Framers
of the Fourth Amendment envisioned the "knock and announce" rule as a flexible
requirement.
66 See HALE, supra note 37, at *582 (explaining that "[i]f it be a warrant for felony, or a
warrant for the surety of the peace, the officer may break open the door, if he be sure the
offender is there, if after acquainting them of the business, and demanding the prisoner, he
refuses to open the door"); 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN,

*150-51. Hale's discussion of the issue illustrates that the notice rule also applied to search
warrants: "If the door be shut, and upon demand it be refused to be opened by them within,
if the stolen goods be in the house, the officer may break open the door .. " According to
Hawkins, the "law doth never allow of such extremities but in cases of necessity; and
therefore, that no one can justify the breaking open of another's doors to make an arrest,
unless he first signify to those in the house the cause of his coming, and request them to give
him admittance." HAWKINS, supra note 45, at ch. 14, § 1;see also, Goddard, supra note 65,
at 460 (stating that "British legal scholars ...called for strict adherence to the knock and
announce rule").
67 MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN LAW 320 (3d ed. 1792) (emphasis added).
68 Note, Announcement in Police Entries,supra note 39, at 144 (citations omitted). The

author also illustrates the degree to which the rule of announcement was established at that
time:
In fact, the rule of announcement was so firmly entrenched in England by the latter part
of the eighteenth century, that the proposal by a noted jurist of no-knock powers for the
police was seen as a radical innovation ....In the years immediately before 1791,

then, search without announcement was not countenanced, despite repeated attempts to
broaden search powers to include it.
Id. at 144 n.22.
69 Id.at 143 n.20.
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1791 discussing exceptions to announcement. '70 Contrary to the impression
conveyed in Wilson, American law circa 1791 did not recognize any exception
to the notice rule even in cases involving threats to an officer's safety 7' or the
potential destruction of evidence. 72 The first case to recognize an exception to
the notice requirement was not decided until 1822, thirty-one years after the
Fourth Amendment was ratified. 73 Moreover, when the Constitution was
debated among the Framers and Ratifiers, the laws of several States guaranteed
a rigid announcement rule. As William Cuddihy described, "[t]he statutes and
legal manuals of at least seven states permitted forcible entry only after a
householder had refused to admit a searcher under circumstances that included
70 Id. at 144. See also Goddard, supra note 65, at 460-61 (noting that "[e]arly American
precedent generally required officers to give prior notice of their authority and purpose
before making a forcible entry, regardless of the context of the entry" (citation omitted)).
7'Cf Goddard, supra note 65, at 461 (citing Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822), as the
first American case where a court "dispensed with the [notice] rule in a case of 'imminent
danger' to the officer"); Mericli, supra note 37, at 133 (citing Read v. Case as the earliest
American case justifying departure from the notice rule where there was reason to believe
that imminent danger might be caused by an announced entry).
72 See Driscoll, supra note 49, at 26-27 (stating that there are no American decisions
prior to 1791 recognizing an exception to the announcement rule for cases involving the
potential destruction of evidence); Goddard, supra note 65, at 462 (explaining that the
"destruction of evidence exception emerged during the Prohibition Era, when American
courts were reviewing forcible entries to search or arrest for possession of easily destructible
evidence such as alcohol, drugs, and gambling paraphernalia" (citation omitted)).
13 See Read v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822). Read created what is now commonly referred
to as the 'peril exception' to the knock and announce rule. See Goddard, supra note 65, at
461. The facts of Read v. Case were as follows. Read and Case had been arrested pursuant
to warrants. 4 Conn. at 167. Case posted bail for Read's release, but later feared that Read
might flee. As a result, Case obtained a writ to have Read taken into custody. Id. When
Case went to Read's home, Read declared that he would protect himself against the
authorities and "resist even to the shedding of blood." Id.Read allowed Case to enter, and
Case then let the sheriff in when he knocked. Id. In this case, the court created a narrow
exception to the requirement of announcement because of the "[i]mminent danger" posed to
the officer. Id. at 170. According to the Court, a requirement of announcement would have
resulted in the most "brutal and unhallowed vengeance." Id. In finding this exception, the
court relied both on the element of danger and on the fact that Read already had "full
knowledge" of the purpose of the officer's visit. Id.
Professor Blakey cites Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816), as the "leading American
case" regarding forcible entry into a home. Blakey, supra note 59, at 504. But he also notes
that Oystead actually turned on a procedural point about the way the action was pleaded. Id.
at 504 n.41. Therefore, while Oystead does discuss the rights of a permanent lodger to be
free from forcible civil arrest, he concludes that it is not authority for an exception to the
announcement rule. Id.; see also, Sonnenreich & Ebner, supra note 59, at 629 (questioning
whether the statement regarding a right to be free from forcible entry of one's home "was
necessary to the decision" in Oystead). While the holding in Oystead has been debated,
there is no doubt that the Framers did not have Oystead's holding in mind when they
adopted the Fourth Amendment, twenty-five years before Oystead was decided.
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smuggling, counterfeiting, and trading with the enemy. '74
In sum, Wilson creates the impression that the Framers understood the
knock and announce principle as a flexible rule. That interpretation is
historically inaccurate.
In 1791, the announcement rule was a rigid
requirement, 75 and American courts only recognized certain exceptions to the
rule thirty years after the Fourth Amendment was ratified. 76 If the scope of the
Fourth Amendment is to be measured by the "traditional protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of
the framing, ' 77 then an accurate description of the legal norms understood and
experienced by the Framers in 1791 is essential to that determination. By that
measure, Wilson's historical analysis is seriously flawed. 78 In fact, Wilson
demonstrates that when the Justices attempt to ascertain the Framers' original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment, the Court's historical analysis will
not always be restricted to those legal norms that existed prior to 1791.79

74 Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1512 (citing statutes of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New

York, New Jersey, South Carolina, and Georgia).
15 Professor Davies contends that the use of history in Wilson was nothing more than
pretense, writing that:
The simple fact is that the modern flexible reasonableness standard applied in Wilson
was unknown to the common law. The Justices' decision to relax the requirements for
the execution of a search warrant was not based in history; rather it was a departure
from historical doctrine. The suggestion that the decision was in any way supported by
historical doctrine was only pretense.
Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, supra note 9, at 741 n.561.
76 See Goddard, supra note 65, at 462 (noting that "the early common-law exceptions
involved either imminent bodily danger to the officers or the suspect's knowledge of an
officer's presence and purpose," thus concluding that "early American courts ... narrowly
construed the type of exigent circumstances that would constitute exceptions to the knock
and announce rule" (citation omitted)); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, supra note
39, at 159 n.88 (describing Read v. Case as creating a "narrow exception" to the
requirement of notice).
77 Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931.
78 See, e.g., Driscoll, supra note 49, at 27 (noting that with the exception of one English
case decided in 1619 "involving an unusual factual setting," all of the other cases that
Justice Thomas cited for the proposition that the common-law principle of announcement
was never stated as an inflexible rule "were decided in the nineteenth century"). Driscoll
contends that Justice Thomas' assertion to be guided by the Framers' original intent, "if
applied strictly, would require a skeptical appraisal of claims that the Fourth Amendment's
knock-and-announce principle includes an exception for situations presenting a danger of
destruction of evidence." Stated differently, the Framers' intentions must be measured by
what they knew, and not by what they could forecast. See generally, United States v.
Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 687 (1998) (commenting that "[t]he presumed influence of English
law on the intentions of the Framers hardly invests the Framers with clairvoyance, and
subsequent English developments are not attributable to the Framers by some rule of
renvoi").
19My point here is that Wilson inaccurately describes the announcement rule that existed
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Wilson and its progeny also demonstrate that the Justices' insistence on
mixing historical considerations with modem legal concepts will often result in
the emergence of legal rules that lack connection to the Framers'
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. Almost two years after Wilson was
decided, in Richards v. Wisconsin,8" the Court confronted the question of
whether a blanket exception to the announcement rule was permissible when
police execute a search warrant in a felony drug investigation. Although
Richards held that the Fourth Amendment does not allow a blanket exception
to the knock and announce rule for felony drug investigations, the Court
unanimously ruled that "to justify a 'no-knock' entry, the police must have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the
particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit
the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the
destruction of evidence." 81 Under this standard, police do not need probable
cause of exigent circumstances, as is required when the police enter a home
without a warrant to execute a search or conduct an arrest. 82 Instead, all that is
required before police enter a home unannounced is a reasonable suspicion of a
83
threat, which the Court conceded was not an onerous test.
It is not surprising that Richards allowed unannounced entries on reasonable
suspicion that knocking and announcing would threaten either police safety or
the integrity of a criminal investigation. After all, like Wilson, the analysis in
Richards proceeds on the premise that the common-law announcement rule is
84
compatible with the modem notion of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
Created in 1968,85 the reasonable suspicion standard has been a staple of

in 1791. Without an accurate description of the rule, the Court is unable to satisfy its selfimposed standard of "look[ing] to the traditional protections against unreasonable searches
and seizures afforded by the common law at the time of the framing." Wilson, 514 U.S. at
931. Thus, the Court should have accurately described the announcement rule in its
entirety. Whether exceptions to the announcement rule (and their scope) are consistent with
the Fourth Amendment is a separate question from what the announcement rule required in
1791. As illustrated above, when the Amendment was adopted, there were no recognized
exceptions to the rule. Because the facts in Wilson did not involve any exceptions, the Court
should have waited for another case to confront whether exceptions to the rule would be
constitutionally recognized.
80 520 U.S. 385 (1997).
81 Id. at 394.
82 See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 (1990); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 298 (1967).
83 520 U.S. at 394-95 (acknowledging that "[t]his showing is not high, but the police
should be required to make it whenever the reasonableness of a no-knock entry is
challenged").
84 Id. at 387.
85 The "reasonable suspicion" standard originated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Although the Terry Court never used the term "reasonable suspicion," the standard has
nevertheless evolved from that case. See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Terry v. Ohio, The Warren
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modem search and seizure doctrine, often replacing the textual standards of
warrants and probable cause. The predictability of the result in Richards,
however, cannot obscure the great distance the Court traveled from the
Framers' original understanding of the announcement principle. As already
demonstrated, exceptions to the knock and announce rule were unknown to the
Framers in 1791. Furthermore, the reasonable suspicion standard has no roots
in Framing-era law, as a reasonable suspicion test was unknown to legal
scholars at that time. 86 Furthermore, the reasonable suspicion standard has
87
absolutely no nexus with the text of the Fourth Amendment.
Despite these historical anomalies, a unanimous Court in Richards permitted
no-knock entries under a test the police can easily satisfy. This result simply
would not have been possible under a strict "originalist" analysis. Richards'
approval of no-knock entries based on reasonable suspicion was instead

Court, and the Fourth Amendment: A Law Clerk's Perspective, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 891,
896 (1998). It was only in cases subsequent to Terry that the Court began using the term
"reasonable suspicion" to describe the quantum of evidence needed to justify a challenged
search or seizure. See, e.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1979); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881-84 (1975). More recently, the Court has conceded that
"the concept of reasonable suspicion is somewhat abstract," United States v. Arvizu, 122 S.
Ct. 744, 751 (2002), and the Court has been unwilling to provide a precise definition of the
concept. See Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695 (1996) ("Articulating precisely
what 'reasonable suspicion' and 'probable cause' mean is not possible.").
86 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 629 n.216
(noting that "there is no historical precedent for the general authority of police officers to
detain persons based on 'reasonable suspicion' as authorized by [Terry]").
" The Solicitor General's office has consistently taken the position that "knock and
announce" cases do not require police officers to satisfy traditional Fourth Amendment
safeguards. Judging from the results in Wilson and Richards, the Solicitor General's
arguments seem to have greatly influenced the Court. For example, in Wilson, the Solicitor
General contended that the "exigent circumstances" test, which is used to judge the
constitutionality of a warrantless intrusion of a home, is inapplicable in a "knock and
announce" case because the announcement rule is not mandated by the text of the Fourth
Amendment. See Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 16-17, Wilson v. Arkansas, 514
U.S. 927 (1995). In Richards, the Solicitor General proffered a different version of the
same argument. There, the Solicitor General stated that "exigent circumstances"
is the phrase used to describe the justification needed to dispense with a warrant
altogether before entering a dwelling. In the context of an unannounced entry, by
contrast, the officers have ordinarily obtained a warrant. Thus, a magistrate has already
authorized the intrusion into the residence, and, as Wilson makes clear, the question is
only whether it would be 'reasonable' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to
dispense with the knock-and-announce requirement. It stands to reason that an
unannounced entry pursuant to a warrant may be 'reasonable' under circumstances that
would not justify a wholly warrantless entry into a dwelling. Indeed, in Wilson, this
Court did not use the term 'exigent circumstances' and stressed instead that an
unannounced entry need only meet a 'flexible' reasonableness standard that weighs the
relevant 'law enforcement interests.'
Brief of Amicus Curiae United States at 21 n. II (citations omitted).
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constructed with the tools of modem search and seizure doctrine. 88 The upshot
of mixing historical norms with modem legal rules-a practice repeated in
Wilson and continued in Richards-is a search and seizure jurisprudence alien
to the Framers' thinking. More importantly, by allowing unannounced entries
based upon a lenient standard of suspicion, the Court has diluted the
protections established under the common-law's announcement rule, which
ultimately undermines the "original intent" of the Framers to secure the
89
sanctity and security of the home.
To summarize, although Wilson is often seen as a straightforward example
of how history informs Fourth Amendment cases, a close examination of that
case raises several questions about the Court's use of history. In particular,
Wilson gives a mixed response to the crucial question of how much weight the
Court accords to historical concerns. On the one hand, Justice Thomas devotes
the bulk of his opinion to recognizing the importance of the announcement
principle during the Framers' era and that this aspect of his historical analysis
compelled the Court to elevate the knock and announce rule to constitutional
status. On the other hand, the bottom-line in Wilson is clear: The Framers'
conception of the knock and announce rule did not survive when balanced
against the needs of modem law enforcement. Ironically, although Wilson
purports to be guided by Framing-era understandings of what the Fourth
Amendment intended, "the entire history of the debates surrounding the Bill of
Rights contains not a single reference to the importance of enabling the crimesolving function of the federal government." 90 The law enforcement
exceptions to the announcement rule identified in Wilson did not exist in 1791,
and the reasonable suspicion standard for unannounced entries approved by
Richards has no roots in either the history or text of the Fourth Amendment.
B.

Fourth Amendment Cases That Justify A HistoricalInquiry
Although Wilson raises several questions about the Court's use of history in
its Fourth Amendment analysis, the case does partially answer one question
about history and the Fourth Amendment by identifying which cases call for a
historical inquiry. Wilson demonstrates that the Court will examine the
common law and the Framers' views when the historical pedigree of a Fourth
Amendment claim is pure. Most Fourth Amendment disputes, however, do not
88 Similarly, Richards' casual dictum approving pre-approved no-knock warrants is a

product of modem search and seizure law. See 520 U.S. at 396 n.7 (claiming that "[t]he
practice of allowing magistrates to issue no-knock warrants seems entirely reasonable when
sufficient cause to do so can be demonstrated ahead of time"). There is no evidence in the
history of the Fourth Amendment supporting pre-approved no-knock warrants.
89 As William Cuddihy suggests, "[u]nannounced searches were probably' a third
category of the unreasonable processes that the Fourth Amendment forbade. In most states,

custom, practice, or legislation required searchers to request admittance into a home and
break in only if they had to." Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1511.

90 Thomas, supra note 48, at 168.
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have roots in seventeenth- or eighteenth-century common law, and for these
modem disputes, the question of when history matters remains unanswered.
The Court's recent rulings provide few clues on when the Justices will turn to
historical sources to resolve modem search and seizure issues.
Consider, for example, the Court's use of history in Vernonia School
District v. Acton,9 1 decided one month after Wilson. Acton concerned the
constitutionality of a school district's program of random urinalysis drug
testing of student-athletes. 92 Five Justices, including Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer, joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion, which held that suspicionless93
drug testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment rights of student-athletes.
Despite Justice O'Connor's long dissent discussing the Framers' views on
general searches, 94 the majority opinion paid no attention to the history
surrounding the Fourth Amendment.
Justice Scalia apparently saw no reason to consult the history of the Fourth
Amendment in Acton because "there was no clear practice, either approving or
disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the constitutional provision
was enacted." 95 Contending that the issue concerned the rights of public
school students, Justice Scalia assumed that the Framers would have had no
opinion on the constitutional validity of suspicionless drug testing of
students. 96 He noted that compulsory schools did not exist until 1852, and that
drug abuse and drug testing are modem phenomena. 97 In a footnote, Justice
Scalia curtly dismissed Justice O'Connor's historical analysis: "Of course at
the time of the framing, as well as at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, children had substantially fewer 'rights' than legislatures and
98
courts confer upon them today."
91 515 U.S. 646 (1995).

Id. at 649-50.
93 Id. at 660-64.
94 Id. at 666-86.
92

95 Id. at 652 (citation omitted).
96 Although Justice Scalia correctly assumed that the Framers held no opinion on the
suspicionless drug testing of school students, by narrowing the focus of his historical
analysis to drug testing, rather than the Framers' views regarding suspicionless searches
generally, Justice Scalia was able to ignore a vast amount of Fourth Amendment history. As
Professor Tom Clancy has explained, "the historical record demonstrates that the framers
believed that individualized suspicion was an inherent quality of reasonable searches and
seizures. Indeed, history discloses that the chief vice the framers sought to prevent was
suspicionless searches and seizures." Thomas K. Clancy, The Role of Individualized
Suspicion in Assessing the Reasonableness of Searches and Seizures, 25 U. MEMPHIS L.
REV. 483, 489 (1995) (citation omitted); see also id. at 528 (articulating that "[tihe core
complaint of the colonists was not that [British] searches and seizures were warranted,
warrantless, or unauthorized actions; it was the general, suspicionless nature of the searches
and seizures" (citation omitted)).
97 See 515 U.S. at 653 n.l.
98 Id. at 665 n.4.
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While the Acton majority concluded that the Fourth Amendment's origins
were irrelevant to the reasonableness of random drug testing of student-

athletes, the dissenting Justices argued that history supported their conclusion
that "mass, suspicionless searches have been generally considered per se
unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."99 Justice
O'Connor's dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, noted that "what
the Framers of the Fourth Amendment most strongly opposed.., were general

searches-that is, searches by general warrant, by writ of assistance, by broad
statute, or by any other similar authority." 100 She bolstered this claim by citing

specific historical episodes indicating the Framers' opposition to general
searches.10 1
Justice O'Connor used history to identify a broad norm embodied in the
Fourth Amendment: disapproval of suspicionless searches. Her historical
analysis was not centered on the Amendment's text, although she did mention
parts of the text to support her thesis that the Framers' opposed general
searches.' 0 2 Justice O'Connor looked beyond the Amendment's text to
identify other types of "unreasonable" searches not explicitly prohibited by the
Warrant Clause. Relying on William Cuddihy's dissertation on the history of
the Fourth Amendment, 103 she noted that general warrants were singled-out in
the text "because the abuses of the general warrant were particularly vivid in
the minds of the Framers' generation,.... and not because the Framers viewed
04
other kinds of general searches as any less unreasonable."'
Similarly, Justice O'Connor consulted history even though the historical
record did not address the precise type of search at issue in the case. She thus
conceded that the available evidence on the Framers' thinking regarding

I at 667 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Ioo
ld.at 669 (citations omitted).
10' Id.at 670-71.
102 Justice O'Connor opined that:
[T]he particular way the Framers chose to curb the abuses of general warrants-and by
implication, all general searches-was not to impose a novel 'evenhandedness'
requirement; it was to retain the individualized suspicion requirement contained in the
typical general warrant, but to make that requirement meaningful and enforceable, for
instance, by raising the required level of individualized suspicion to objective probable
cause.
Id. at 670 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). On this point, Justice O'Connor relied upon Professor
Clancy's historical analysis, which acknowledges that the plain text of the Amendment
"does not mandate individualized suspicion as a necessary component of all searches and
seizures." Clancy, supra note 96, at 489. Still, the Amendment's history and the procedural
safeguards contained in the Warrant Clause indicate that "the framers were seeking to
ensure that freedom from suspicionless intrusions was guaranteed. Thus, for the former
colonists, particularized suspicion of wrongdoing was an irreducible minimum for a search
or seizure." Id. at 529.
103 Cuddihy, supra note 37.
'04 515 U.S. at 669 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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searches of students was "extremely scarce." 10 5 Justice O'Connor did not,
however, find it necessary to demonstrate an all-embracing tradition
condemning suspicionless searches. Rather, she recognized that "not all
searches around the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted required
individualized suspicion-although most did." 10 6 For example, searching
incident to a lawful arrest did not generate consternation during the Framing
era, even though the search occurred without individualized suspicion. Still,
this exception to the rule against suspicionless searches did not unsettle Justice
O'Connor's conclusion that the Fourth Amendment embodied a broad norm
disapproving general searches.
Three years after the Court decided Wilson and Acton, it had still not
reached a consensus on which modem search and seizure disputes call for a
historical inquiry. The division among the Justices on this issue was evident in
Minnesota v. Carter.10 7 In Carter,the Court decided whether an invited guest

could rely upon the privacy of his host's home to protect him against an
unreasonable police intrusion. An informant told a police officer that three
people inside a ground-floor apartment were putting white powder into plastic
bags. 10 8 The officer investigated by looking into the premises through a gap in
the closed window blinds of the apartment, and observed two men, Carter and
Johns, together with the woman who leased the apartment, placing a white,
powdery substance into bags. 10 9 Based on the officer's observations, the police
later arrested the men outside the apartment. 110 A search of the apartment
pursuant to a warrant revealed evidence of narcotics trafficking. After being
indicted, Carter and Johns argued that the officer's initial observation of their
criminal activities constituted an illegal search.1 11
Writing for a divided Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist reversed the ruling of
the Minnesota Supreme Court and held that the defendants did not have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their host's apartment. In reaching this
conclusion, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not discuss the history of the Fourth
Amendment. According to him, even the text of the Amendment, which
"suggests that its protections extend only to people in 'their' houses,"'" 2 was
not controlling because the Court's precedents have held that "in some
circumstances a person may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
house of someone else." '" 13 According to the Chief Justice, the defendants
were simply invited business guests, and as such were not entitled to the same
'05 Id. at 681 n.1.
106 Id. at 671.
107

525 U.S. 83 (1998).

108 Id. at 85.
109 Id.
110

Id.

I Id. at 86.
112
113

Id.at 89.
Id.
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1 14
protection the Fourth Amendment affords to overnight guests.'
The Chief Justice's conclusion in Carter rested on the facts of the case and
stare decisis. His brief opinion did not touch on the Fourth Amendment's
history. Justice Scalia, however, had a different view of the case. Justice
Scalia contended that the Court's precedents in this area "give[] short shrift to
the text of the Fourth Amendment, and to the well and long understood
meaning of that text."1 15 According to Justice Scalia, historical sources
supported his view that Carter and Johns were not entitled to constitutional
11 6
protection.
First, Justice Scalia asserted it is "not linguistically possible" to read the text
of the Amendment to extend protection to a person invited into someone else's
home. 1 7 "The obvious meaning of the provision is that each person has the
right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures in his own
person, house, papers, and effects." 1 18 Next, Justice Scalia argued that
"Founding-era materials" bolster the view that an individual cannot rely on the
protection of a third party's home. 1 9 When the Fourth Amendment was
proposed and ratified, the search and seizure provisions of four state
constitutions contained language similar to the language used in the Fourth
Amendment. 2 0 According to Justice Scalia, there is no evidence that these
provisions were meant to protect a visitor inside someone else's home.' 21 He
also quoted statements from Sir Edward Coke and Thomas Cooley, and dicta

Justice Rehnquist explained that the defendants' case was "somewhere in
between" the situation of an overnight guest, who is entitled to Fourth Amendment
protection, and a person who is simply "legitimately on the premises," who is not entitled to
constitutional protection. Id. at 91. Ultimately, the Court held that the defendants were not
entitled to constitutional protection:
[T]he purely commercial nature of the transaction engaged in here, the relatively short
period of time on the premises, and the lack of any previous connection between [the
defendants] and the householder, all lead us to conclude that [the defendants'] situation
is closer to that of one simply permitted on the premises. We therefore hold that any
search which may have occurred did not violate their Fourth Amendment rights.
Id.
115 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
116 Id. at 92.
117See id. More specifically, Justice Scalia stated:
[I]t is not linguistically possible to give the provision [an] expansive interpretation with
respect to "houses" without giving it the same interpretation with respect to the nouns
that are parallel to "houses"----"persons, . . . papers, and effects"-which would give
me a constitutional right not to have your person unreasonably searched. This is so
absurd that it has to my knowledge never been contemplated.
Id.
114 Chief

118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at
121 Id. at

93.
93-94.
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from an 1815 English case 122 and an 1816 American case, 123 all of which
suggest that the security an individual enjoyed in their own home did not
extend to persons temporarily in another's home. 24 In sum, Justice Scalia
believed that the Fourth Amendment's history provided a clear answer to the
125
issue before the Court.
Four months after the Court decided Carter, Justice Scalia persuaded a
majority of the Court to agree that history matters a great deal when
interpreting the Fourth Amendment. In Wyoming v. Houghton, 26 Justice
Scalia wrote for six Justices when he stated that in determining whether a
challenged police intrusion violates the Fourth Amendment, "we inquire first
whether the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the
common law when the Amendment was framed."' 27 If the common law
"yields no answer," the Court should then use a modem balancing formula to
122
123
124

Johnson v. Leigh, 6 Taunt. 246, 248, 128 Eng. Rep. 1029, 1030 (C.P. 1815).
Oystead v. Shed, 13 Mass. 520 (1816)
Professor Davies explained that the passages cited by Justice Scalia do not address the

issue at stake in Carter. Rather, the cited statements
pertain to situations where a non-resident who was either already lawfully pursued by
officers and subject to arrest or already subject to execution of a civil court judgment
was attempting to use the house of another as a refuge. In contrast, there was no basis
for arresting the nonresidents in Carter except for evidence obtained during a search of
the house the nonresidents had visited.
Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, supra note 9, at 743 n.564.
125 See 525 U.S. at 96. Justice Scalia described the situation by saying that "in deciding
the question presented today we write upon a slate that is far from clean. The text of the
Fourth Amendment, the common-law background against which it was adopted, and the
understandings consistently displayed after its adoption make the answer clear." Id. In his
concurrence, Justice Kennedy questioned the significance of common-law principles to the
issue at stake in Carter. After noting that scholars have conflicting interpretations of
Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604), and the protection it
affords to a home, Justice Kennedy stated that the result and reasoning in Semayne's Case
"would not be dispositive of the question before us." Id. at 99-100. In contrast to Justice
Scalia, Justice Kennedy endorsed a use of history that focused on a general theme, rather
than on specific applications. Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, the protection afforded
to the home under the Fourth Amendment "has acquired over time a power and an
independent significance justifying a more general assurance of personal security in one's
home, an assurance which has become part of our constitutional tradition." Id. Justice
Kennedy's comments prompted Justice Scalia to retort:
The issue in this case, however, is not 'personal security in one's home,' but personal
security in someone else's home, as to which Justice Kennedy fails to identify any
'constitutional tradition' other than the one I have described-leaving us with nothing
but his personal assurance that some degree of protection higher than that (and higher
than what the people have chose to provide by law) is 'justitlied].'
Id. at 94 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Carterdid not discuss the
history of the Amendment.
126 526 U.S. 295 (1999).
127 Id. at 299.
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decide the legality of the intrusion.1 28 Houghton's standard on the relevance of
history is significant because the Court "was a good deal more emphatic than
the suggestion in Wilson v. Arkansas that eighteenth-century understandings
'may' give content to the Fourth Amendment."1 29
At issue in Houghton was whether a valid search of an automobile for
narcotics could include searching a passenger's purse even though the police
had no reason believe that the purse contained drugs. 30 The Court approved
the search; it reasoned that probable cause to believe narcotics are present in a
car gives the police discretion to search all containers in the car that are
capable of holding narcotics.1 3 1 In concluding that the search of Houghton's
purse was reasonable, Justice Scalia first noted that "Congress from 1789
through 1799[,] as well as subsequent legislation from the founding era and
beyond,"' 3 2 authorized customs officers to conduct warrantless searches of
ships where there was probable cause of a customs violation. According to
Justice Scalia, this historical evidence indicates that "the Framers would have
regarded as reasonable (if there was probable cause) the warrantless search of
containers within an automobile."133 Though Justice Scalia was apparently
prepared to let history control the result in Houghton,134 his belief that the
search was proper under a modem balancing test is evident in his statement
that "[e]ven if the historical evidence ... were thought to be equivocal, we
would find that the balancing of the relative interests weighs decidedly in favor
35
of allowing searches of a passenger's belongings."1
Houghton's historical analysis is noteworthy for several reasons. First,
Justice Breyer joined Justice Scalia's opinion "with the understanding that
history is meant to inform, but not automatically to determine, the answer to a
Fourth Amendment question."' 36 Thus, without Justice Breyer's vote, only a
28 Id. at 299-300.
129 Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1760.
130

526 U.S. at 297.

Ia' at 307.
Id.
Id. at 300.
133 Id. (discussing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (holding that where
"probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of
every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search")).
134 Justice Scalia expressed his apparent willingness to let history control the result with
the following statement:
When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for
police officers-like customs officials in the founding era-to examine packages and
containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one. A
passenger's personal belongings, just like the driver's belongings or containers
attached to the car like a glove compartment, are 'in' the car, and the officer has
probable cause to search for contraband in the car.
Id. at 302.
135Id. at 303.
132

136 Id. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring).

Justice Breyer's statement is somewhat
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slim majority of the Court appears ready, like Justice Scalia, to commit to a
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence under which history mechanically resolves
137
modem search and seizure disputes.
Second, like Wilson v. Arkansas, Houghton reflects the selective way the
Court employs history. Under the standard of review announced in Houghton,
the Court first inquires whether the police intrusion "was regarded as an
unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed."' 38 "Strictly speaking," 139 however, the Court did not analyze any
examples of the common law in Houghton. "Instead [Justice Scalia] relied on
federal legislation in the late-eighteenth century authorizing warrantless
inspections of ships by customs officers with probable cause to suspect the
presence of contraband."' 140 Carroll v. United States14 1 and United States v.
ambiguous. On the one hand, Justice Breyer may be explaining that while he is willing to
join Justice Scalia's opinion, his own view of the role that history plays in Fourth
Amendment analysis is that "history is meant to inform, but not automatically to determine,
the answer to a Fourth Amendment question." Id.at 307. On the other hand, Justice Breyer
may be explaining that he interprets Justice Scalia's opinion as standing for the proposition
that "history is meant to inform, but not automatically to determine, the answer to a Fourth
Amendment question." Id. If the latter interpretation correctly describes Justice Breyer's
position, then Justice Breyer's reading of the standard announced in Houghton seems
strained. There is nothing ambiguous about Justice Scalia's standard, although the
application of that standard is somewhat uncertain due to Justice Scalia's willingness to
engage in a balancing test notwithstanding the apparent historical support for the challenged
search. See infra note 147. Under Justice Scalia's standard, history determines the legality
of a search or seizure. See 526 U.S. at 299 (declaring that "[i]n determining whether a
particular governmental action violates [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether
the action was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the
Amendment was framed"). If a historical inquiry "yields no answer" on the legality of the
search or seizure, then the Court conducts a balancing analysis. Id. at 299-300. The
uncertainty, then, really lies only in the application of this standard.
137The membership and strength of that majority is disrupted (if not confused) after
Atwater. Justice Souter, who dissented in Houghton, authored the majority opinion in
Atwater, which relies heavily on history to uphold a warrantless arrest for a non-violent
misdemeanor. See infra notes 241-273 and accompanying text. Although Justice Souter's
opinion in Atwater does not quote the rigid Houghton standard that says history controls
unless it provides an unequivocal answer, he does criticize Justice O'Connor's dissent in
Atwater for choosing "not to deal with history at all," 532 U.S. at 345 n.14, and for
diminishing the importance of history to Fourth Amendment analysis. Id.("History,
moreover, is not just 'one of the tools' relevant to a Fourth Amendment inquiry." (citation
omitted)). On the other hand, Justice O'Connor, who joined Houghton without comment,
supports the statement in her Atwater dissent that "history is just one of the tools we use in
conducting the reasonableness inquiry," 532 U.S. at 361, by citing Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Houghton, in which he refused to endorse a Fourth Amendment standard that
gives controlling weight to common-law norms.
138 526 U.S. at 299 (emphasis added).
139 Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1760.
140 Id.
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Ross 142 analyzed this same legislation. But those cases, like Houghton, do not
mention that "the warrantless search authority given to customs officers in
1789 was aimed at the smuggling of foreign goods across America's
international border, whereas the search[es] in [Carroll, Ross, and Houghton]
43
involved ...ordinary police operation[s] within the interior of the country.'
The views of Framing-era judges and lawyers regarding the legality of
searches of carts and wagons traveling within the interior of the country has
not yet been discovered, 144 and certainly was not discussed in Houghton.
Finally, Justice Scalia's efforts to allow common-law norms to control the
scope of modem search and seizure doctrine prompted Justice Stevens to note
in his dissent in Houghton that the Court has "never restricted [itself] to a twostep Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and governmental
interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century common law 'yields
no answer."' 145 Justice Stevens' reaction, combined with Justice Breyer's
unwillingness to endorse a Fourth Amendment analysis that gives controlling
weight to common-law norms, reveals a substantial disagreement among the
Justices over the determinativeness of history in Fourth Amendment disputes.
Thus, five years after a unanimous Court in Wilson v. Arkansas signaled that
Fourth Amendment law might conform to "the common law at the time of the
framing,"' 146 the Court entered the 2000 Term without a consensus on the role
47
history plays in determining the scope of the Amendment. 1

141 267
142

U.S. 132, 150-53 (1925).
456 U.S. 798, 805-06 (1982).

143

Tracey Maclin, What Can Fourth Amendment Doctrine Learn from Vagueness

Doctrine?, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 398, 445 n.199 (2001); see also, Forrest R. Black, A
Critique of the Carroll Case, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 1068, 1075 (1929) (recognizing the plenary
power of Congress to routinely stop and search persons and things at the international
border, but noting that "no constitutional authority can be cited for such a summary
procedure when applied to motorists driving within the boundaries of the United States on a
public highway").
144 William Cuddihy notes that "[d]ocumentation on searches of carts and other wheeled
conveyances is sparse, and only one trial precedent on the subject has come to light, a New
York case that preceded the Fourth Amendment by over a century," which did not address
the legality of a search of a cart. Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1549 n.387 (citation omitted).
Professor Davies argues that the Court's historical judgment that cars are the equivalent of
ships is wrong because the Framers did not intend or anticipate that ship searches would be
controlled by the Fourth Amendment. See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, supra note 9, at 605-06 (asserting that in "late eighteenth-century thought,
ships were neither 'houses, papers, and effects [or possessions]' nor 'places,"' but instead
"[t]hey were ships" (citation omitted)). Professor Davies criticizes Carroll'sconclusion that
the Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to control searches and seizures of ships as
"ahistorical." See id. at 607-08.
14'526 U.S. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146 Wilson, 514 U.S. at 931.
147 In addition to noting the lack of precedent for the Court's "two-step" formulation
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ERRATIC ORIGINALISM: FOURTH AMENDMENT CASES

IN THE 2000 AND 2001 TERMS

The above discussion reveals the deep divisions among the Justices over the
impact history should have on modem Fourth Amendment doctrine. Although
the standard of review announced in Houghton suggests that a historical
inquiry is the starting point for every Fourth Amendment case, the Court's
actual practice indicates that the Justices consider the historical roots of the
Amendment on a selective basis. Since Houghton, the Court has decided
twenty Fourth Amendment cases. 148 History is mentioned in only four of
them. 149 These post-Houghton cases do not provide a framework or pattern
regarding history and modem balancing, Justice Stevens' dissent highlights the majority's
vacillation on the determinative nature of history in Fourth Amendment cases:
Either the majority is unconvinced by its own recitation of the historical materials, or it
has determined that considering additional factors is appropriate in any event. The
Court does not admit the former; and of course the latter, standing alone, would not
establish uncertainty in the common law as the prerequisite to looking beyond history
in Fourth Amendment cases.
Houghton, 526 U.S. at 311 n.3. Justice Stevens was joined in dissent by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg.
148 See Kirk v. Louisiana, 122 S.Ct. 2458 (2002) (per curiam); United States v. Drayton,
122 S.Ct. 2105 (2002); Bd. of Ed. of Independent Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County

v. Earls, 122 S.Ct. 1062 (2002); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002); United States
v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001); Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001); Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001);
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32
(2000); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000); Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000);
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000); Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11 (1999) (per
curiam); Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999); Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999)
(per curiam); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999).
Although Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001), presented a Fourth Amendment issue,
the Court did not reach the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim.
149 The references to history in Wilson v. Layne and Florida v. White are perfunctory.
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. at 609-10 (noting the "centuries-old principle of respect for
the home"); White, 526 U.S. at 564 (noting that the holding in Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, (1925), was "rooted in federal law enforcement practice at the time of the
adoption of the Fourth Amendment" ). Kyllo held that using a thermal-imaging machine to
detect the level of heat emanating from a home was a "search" under the Fourth
Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia relied on several factors unrelated
to history. See 533 U.S. at 35-39. Nonetheless, an important element in Justice Scalia's
thinking was also "assur[ing] preservation of that degree of privacy against government that
existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." Id. at 34. According to Justice Scalia,
the government's use of a device that is not generally available to the public to examine
details of a home "that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion"
violates the privacy of a home. Id. at 40. Aside from this brief historical reference, Kyllo
does not discuss the Fourth Amendment's origins. Justice Scalia's de-emphasis of history in
Kyllo has not gone unnoticed. Professor Sklansky writes that:
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explaining when history matters to the resolution of a Fourth Amendment
issue, and, as a result, they do not identify which Fourth Amendment claims
require an examination of history.
The Justices also disagree as to the determinative quality of historical
considerations. Prior to the 2000 Term, Justices Scalia and Thomas were the
strongest advocates for the view that common-law rules should control the
scope of the Fourth Amendment. 50 Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and
Justice Scalia seemed in Kyllo to have grown more comfortable with the temporal
reorientation of [the] Fourth Amendment in Katz [v. United States, 389 U.S. 347

(1967)]. He seemed less committed to anchoring the Fourth Amendment firmly in its
past, at least in the manner he had previously proposed ....
[His] opinion in Kyllo does
not look to the content of eighteenth-century rules of search and seizure; rather it looks
to what those rules accomplished.
David A. Sklansky, Back To The Future: Kyllo, Katz, and Common Law, _ Miss. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2002); cf Christopher Slobogin, Peeping Techno-Toms and the Fourth
Amendment: Seeing Through Kyllo's Rules Governing Technological Surveillance, 86
MrNN. L. REv. 1393, 1418-19 (2002) (noting that Kyllo "bottomed its analysis of privacy
expectations vis-a-vis enhanced surveillance on historical assumptions," but also explaining
that "[o]ther than its quote from an English case, Kyllo provides nothing in support of its
view that the typical eighteenth century American was unfazed when strangers spied into his
or her home from a public vantage point"). According to Professor Richard Seamon, "[t]he
Court in Kyllo claimed that it took 'the long view, from the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment forward.' This is not just rhetoric; it accurately describes the amalgam of
common law and modem privacy concerns that produced the result in Kyllo." Richard H.
Seamon, Kyllo v. United States and the PartialAscendance of Justice Scalia's Fourth
Amendment, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 1013, 1032-33 (2001); see also Davies, Law-And-Order
Originalism,supra note 9, at 261 (stating that "although Scalia could have said a good deal
about the unique importance of one's house in framing-era common law in [Kyllo], he
discussed the importance of the house primarily in terms of recent precedent rather than
framing-era law" (citation omitted)). Interestingly, Justice Scalia's reasoning tracked the
argument of the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the American Civil
Liberties Union amicus curiae brief in the case, which was authored by Professor James
Tomkovicz. See Brief of Amici Curiae National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
et al. at 26-28 (expressing the view that "[a]t a minimum, the Fourth Amendment is
implicated whenever a device enables officials to breach protected interests in secrecy and
confidentiality by learning concealed information that previously could have been learned
only by means of physical entry into a home or other enclosed space"). The influence of
history is evident in Atwater. See infra notes 244-273 and accompanying text.
'10 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 295-307 (Scalia, J.) (employing an
analysis in which the first inquiry is whether the government action constituted an unlawful
search or seizure at the time of the Framing); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. at 928-36
(Thomas, J.) (focusing exclusively on historical sources in analyzing the Fourth Amendment
claim); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J.)
(objecting that the Court has given "short shrift" to the text of the Amendment and to the
historical sources supporting the "long understood meaning of that text"). While Justices
Scalia and Thomas tend to discuss the history of the Amendment more consistently than the
other Justices, even they do not consider the Amendment's historical roots in every case.
See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. at 91 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting,
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Breyer, on the other hand, have often opposed the use of history to decide
Fourth Amendment cases.1 51 Finally, the Justices have sent mixed signals on

without mentioning history, that a public hospital's practice of drug testing pregnant women
and revealing positive results to police officials does not violate the Fourth Amendment);
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (Scalia, J.) (rejecting the argument that
pretextual traffic stops violate the Fourth Amendment without discussing history); Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (making no mention of history while holding
that a warrantless entry of suspect's home is constitutional when based on the consent of a
third party whom the police reasonably believe to possess common authority over the
premises); see also Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1 (describing the evolution of
Justice Scalia's search and seizure jurisprudence from an approach emphasizing precedent
and bright-line rules to his current approach focusing on the common law). For a harsher
description of the use of history by Justices Scalia and Thomas, see Davies, Law-And-Order
Originalism,supra note 9, at 262-63 (criticizing Justices Scalia and Thomas because "the
invocations of framing-era law that have appeared in recent opinions by [them] have often
been patently superficial and result-driven" (citations omitted)).
1"I See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined
by Souter, J., and Ginsburg, J.) (criticizing the "two-step Fourth Amendment approach
wherein the privacy and government interests at stake must be considered only if 18thcentury common law 'yields no answer"'); id at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring) (joining the
majority's opinion "with the understanding that history is meant to inform, but not
automatically to determine, the answer to a Fourth Amendment question"); Minnesota v.
Carter, 525 U.S. at 106 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J., and Souter, J.)
(ignoring history when determining whether a guest can rely on the privacy of his host's
home); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 647 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court for the sending the message "that the common law, rather than our
understanding of the Fourth Amendment as it has developed over the last quarter of a
century, defines, and limits, the scope of a seizure"); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
591 n.33 (1980) (Stevens, J.). In Payton, Justice Stevens pointed to the differences between
the common-law search and seizure rules and those which have evolved as part of the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
There are important differences between the common-law rules relating to searches and
seizures and those that have evolved through the process of interpreting the Fourth
Amendment in light of contemporary norms and conditions.... Thus, this Court has
not simply frozen into constitutional law those law enforcement practices that existed
at the time of the Fourth Amendment's passage.
Id. The views of Justices O'Connor and Kennedy on the influence of history are hard to
predict. Early in her tenure on the Court, Justice O'Connor indicated that history might
affect her thinking on search and seizure questions, particularly when a Fourth Amendment
claimant challenged a long-standing police practice. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,
26 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor expressed her views as follows:
I am far more reluctant than is the Court to conclude that the Fourth Amendment
proscribes a police practice that was accepted at the time of the adoption of the Bill of
Rights and has continued to receive the support of many state legislatures ....
[F]idelity to the notion of constitutional-as opposed to purely judicial-limits on
governmental action requires us to impose a heavy burden on those who claim that
practices accepted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted are now constitutionally
impermissible.
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the crucial question of how to apply the Fourth Amendment's history: Should
the historical inquiry be limited to identifying which types of searches and
seizures were deemed unreasonable in 1791, or should history be used to
identify the broad values or norms that motivated the Framers to include the
52
Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights?'
In the last two years, the Court decided the merits in eleven Fourth
Amendment cases. In only one case, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, did the
Court examine the Amendment's history.15 3 In the ten other cases decided on
the merits, the Court either ignored the history of the Fourth Amendment or
considered it irrelevant to the results. That the Court would decide ten search

Id. History appears to have impacted Justice O'Connor's thinking in another Fourth
Amendment context, that of suspicionless searches, although in that regard she "seems to
have changed her position on a fundamental issue in constitutional law," and her shift in
positionfavors Fourth Amendment claimants. Cloud, supra note 62, at 1711 (describing the
influence of William Cuddihy's dissertation on Justice O'Connor's views of suspicionless
searches). More recently, in Atwater, Justice O'Connor was dismissive of the Court's
reliance on history when approving a warrantless arrest for a minor traffic offense. See 532
U.S. at 361-363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy's views on the relevance of history to Fourth Amendment analysis are
similarly difficult to gauge. Typically, Justice Kennedy will join a Justice Scalia or Justice
Thomas majority opinion that inquires whether a particular search or seizure was lawful
under the common law. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999). However,
in Minnesota v. Carter,he endorsed a broad view of history that considers general themes,
rather than whether a specific intrusion was acceptable under the common law. See supra
note 125.
152 See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 397. On this point, Professor Amsterdam questions
whether the specific historical experiences that preceded the adoption of the
amendment-the conflicts over trespassory ransackings under general warrants in
England and writs of assistance in the colonies-ought to be taken as the measure of
the evils that the fourth amendment curbs[.] Or should we say at least that practices
such as eavesdropping and the use of spies, known at the time of those conflicts but not
implicated in them, should be held beyond the reach of the amendment?
Id. Professor Davies argues that the text of the Fourth Amendment should not be read as
endorsing any abstract principles or broad values. Instead, according to Davies, the
"historical record of the framing indicates that the Framers saw the Fourth Amendment as a
specific constitutional barricade against the unique threat which legislative approval of
general warrants posed for the structure of common-law authority-not as a general
statement of an abstract principle." Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
supra note 9, at 745. Therefore, in Davies' view:
[E]xcept for the cryptic invocation of a "right" to be secure in person and house, the
text of the Fourth Amendment does not explicate the principles and values that it
serves. Those principles and values can be located only by going outside the text and
examining the larger historical context.

Id.
153 See also Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism, supra note 9, at 261-62 (noting that of
the five Fourth Amendment cases decided in the 2000 Term, Atwater "was the only one in
which much of anything was said regarding original meaning or framing-era law").
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and seizure cases without reference to history is not necessarily surprising. As
noted, past cases demonstrate that the Justices consult history on a selective,
rather than a systematic, basis and remain unsettled about the influence of
history when determining the meaning and scope of the Amendment. A few of
the Fourth Amendment cases of the last two years, however, merit discussion,
not because of what the Justices say about history, but because of what they do
not say.
Consider, for example, the Court's analysis in Illinois v. McArthur, 54 a
little-noticed case.1 55 As described by the Court, MeArthur concerned whether
police, who had probable cause to believe that marijuana was in a home, could
seize the home and prevent the homeowner from entering his premises
unaccompanied by an officer for approximately two hours while the police
obtained a search warrant. Writing for an eight Justice majority, Justice Breyer
ruled that the police seizure of the home did not violate the Fourth
Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, not only did he ignore Houghton's
two-step formula for determining the constitutionality of a challenged
intrusion, but he also ignored two elements of the Fourth Amendment's history
that should have given the Court pause for thought.
In McArthur, two police officers accompanied Charles McArthur's wife
when she went to McArthur's trailer-home to remove her belongings' 56 When
the wife and the officers arrived, McArthur was inside his home, and the
officers remained outside while the wife retrieved her possessions. 57 After
gathering her belongings, the wife informed the officers that McArthur had
concealed "'some dope underneath the couch.""' 158 The officers then knocked
on the door and requested permission to search the home. McArthur denied
the request while standing outside his trailer, 59 after which time the officer in-

531 U.S. 326 (2001).
Although McArthur did not generate much attention in the press, Professor Craig M.
Bradley did write a cogent description of the case in Trial magazine. Craig M. Bradley,
154
155

Illinois v. McArthur: Preserving Evidence Pending Search Warrants, TRIAL,
70.
156 531 U.S. at 328.
157 Id. at 329.
158
'59

JUNE

2001, at

Id.

The officer-in-charge could not "recall whether he told [McArthur] to come out of the
trailer or if [McArthur] came out on his own." People v. McArthur, 713 N.E.2d 93, 94 (111.
App. 4 Dist. 1999). McArthur's presence inside his home was a critical factor in the lower
court's decision to sustain McArthur's Fourth Amendment claim. The court stated that:
[McArthur] was inside his residence when the police came to his door and he refused
to let them search without a search warrant. While the police were still on the premises
defendant moved from the inside of his trailer out onto the front porch when police told
him he had to remain outside the trailer or that he could go inside only if accompanied
by an officer.
Id. at 98. As Professor Bradley has noted, Justice Breyer ignored this "important fact" in his
opinion and "decided this case as if [the defendant] had arrived at the trailer after the police
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charge then told McArthur that he could not re-enter his home without a police
escort. 160 The second officer left the scene to obtain a search warrant, and two
hours later, authorized by a search warrant, the police searched McArthur's
home and found a small amount of marijuana and drug paraphernalia under the
sofa.1 61 McArthur was charged with two misdemeanor offenses.1 62 The
Illinois judiciary sustained his claim that the police seizure of his home
violated the Fourth Amendment, but Justice Breyer's opinion reached a
different conclusion. According to Justice Breyer's opinion, the central
requirement of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness," which the Court
interprets "as establishing rules and presumptions designed to control conduct
of law enforcement officers that may significantly intrude upon privacy
interests. ' 163 Sometimes reasonableness requires warrants, but not always.
Justice Breyer, considering the totality of the circumstances in McArthur,
' 64
would not say "that the warrantless seizure was per se unreasonable."'
Rather than announce a bright-line rule, the Court "balance[d] the privacyrelated and law enforcement related concerns to determine if the intrusion was
reasonable."' 165 Under this balancing formula, Justice Breyer concluded that
the police seizure was reasonable 166
decided to seek a warrant." Bradley, supra note 155, at 70.
160

531 U.S. at 329. The Court noted that the officer allowed McArthur to re-enter his

home two or three times to obtain cigarettes and to make telephone calls. During these reentries, the officer "stood just inside the door to observe what [McArthur] did." Id.
161 Id.
162

McArthur was charged with "unlawfully possessing drug paraphernalia and marijuana

(less than 2.5 grams)." Id.
163 Id. at 330.
164 Id. at 331.
According to Justice Breyer, the facts involved a "plausible claim" of
exigent circumstances. Id. He also noted that the seizure was tailored to the "law
enforcement need," was limited in time and scope, and avoided "significant intrusion into

the home itself." Id.
165 Id. (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979), and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975)). Neither Prouse nor Brignoni-Ponce was a
"house" case.
166 Id. (finding that given the reasonable conduct of the police, the police needs
outweighed the privacy concerns of McArthur). Justice Breyer's holding is consistent with
dicta from Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984). Segura observed that the Fourth
Amendment permits "a perimeter stakeout to prevent anyone from entering [a home] and
destroying evidence." Id. at 814; see also id. at 824 n. 15 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing
that exigent circumstances would not be a precondition for an external stakeout of a home).
McArthur, however, resolved a question that did not need resolution, and avoided an
important issue presented by the facts. The question that needed resolution in McArthur "is
not one of sealing an unoccupied premises but of seizing an occupied dwelling and ejecting
the occupant." Bradley, supra note 155, at 70. As Professor Bradley explains, "Segura
assumed, without deciding, that police could not enter an occupied dwelling to secure the
premises unless exigent circumstances suggested that the evidence was about to be
destroyed." Id. McArthur "finessed" the issue assumed in Segura by suggesting that
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In deciding that the seizure of McArthur's home was reasonable, Justice
Breyer's opinion ignored Houghton's formula for judging the legality of police
intrusions. Under that formula, the Court makes an initial determination of
whether the police conduct "was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure
under the common law when the Amendment was framed."' 67 Only if history
provides no answer, does Houghton instruct that a balancing analysis
determines the legality of the search or seizure. Instead of considering history,
however, Justice Breyer immediately proceeded to a balancing analysis. His
refusal to apply (or even acknowledge) Houghton's method of analysis is not
altogether surprising. After all, it should be remembered that Justice Breyer
concurred with the Houghton majority "with the understanding that history is
meant to inform, but not automatically determine, the answer to a Fourth
Amendment question."1 68
Although Justice Breyer's silence regarding
Houghton's two-step approach may have been predictable, interestingly,
neither Justice Scalia nor Justice Thomas challenged his neglect of Houghton's
standard of review, and neither urged the Court to "inquire whether the action
was regarded as an unlawful search and seizure when the Amendment was
169
framed."
Justice Breyer and the rest of the Court did not consult the historical origins
of the Amendment in McArthur,170 but this inattention does not mean that
history was irrelevant to the claim raised in McArthur. Indeed, if "history is
meant to inform" the resolution of Fourth Amendment issues, 171 then two
fundamental elements of the Amendment's history merited Justice Breyer's
attention. First, the police intrusion in McArthur implicated the sanctity and

McArthur was outside his trailer when the police arrived. Id. In point of fact, McArthur
was inside his home, and "exited only after the police knocked on the door, asked consent to

enter, and announced their intention to seek a search warrant." Id. Thus, the real issue
presented in McArthur, but left undecided, is: "What are police to do when, having probable
cause to search a structure, they fear that evidence may be destroyed while they await a

warrant?" Id. at 71.
167

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299.

168 Id. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
169 Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 563 (1999) (Thomas, J.).
170

Justice Scalia's silence on history is notable, particularly in light of the fact that he

authored Houghton, which announced that a historical inquiry is the starting point for every
Fourth Amendment dispute. 526 U.S. at 299. Justice Stevens also excluded any discussion
of history in his McArthur dissent. Concededly, none of the briefs filed in McArthur urged
the Court to consider the Fourth Amendment's origins or argued that there was a commonlaw rule on the specific problem of impounding a private home while police seek a warrant.
But none of the briefs filed in Houghton urged a historical inquiry, either. The rule
announced in Houghton is not mandated by the Constitution. Although the Court suggested
that this rule is mandated by the indeterminate language the Framers utilized in the
Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment, the rule, like many constitutional
standards, is judge-made law.
17' Houghton, 526 U.S. at 307 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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security of a private home. As the Court acknowledged just a few months after
deciding MeArthur, "[a]t the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the
right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."' 17 2 Protecting the security of private homes was
certainly a priority for the Framers. Indeed, one could say that the Framers
were particularly sensitive about safeguarding private homes from
governmental intrusion, as the constitutional privilege against unreasonable
search and seizure "arose from the harsh experience of householders having
their doors hammered open by magistrates and writ-bearing agents of the
crown. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment is explainable only by the history and
memory of such abuse."' 173 The intrusions that the colonists experienced at the
hands of British customs officers "had done violence to the ancient maxim that
' I7 4
'A man's house is his castle.""
There is no doubt that the Framers envisioned the home as deserving special
protection from governmental intrusion. The common law developed strict
rules regarding when an officer could forcibly enter a person's home to
effectuate an arrest or conduct a search. 175 Arrest warrants were generally
required to enter a home to make an arrest, 176 and warrants were obligatory if

172

Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States,

365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)).
173William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man's House was not his Castle: Origins of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 372
(1980); see also Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 602
n.139. Professor Davies quotes a 1772 report (likely authored by Samuel Adams)
describing the impact of writs of assistance:
[O]ur homes and even our bedchambers, are exposed to be ransacked, our boxes chests
& trunks broke open ravaged and plundered by wretches, whom no prudent man would
venture to employ even as menial servants; whenever they are pleased to say they
suspect there are in the house wares etc. for which the dutys have not been paid.
Flagrant instances of the wanton exercise of this power, have frequently happened in
this and other sea port Towns. By this we are cut off from that domestick security
which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.
Id.
114JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 20 (1966).
"I Under the common law, officers had to comply with the knock and announce rule
before forcibly entering a home to execute a warrant. Also, prior to the 1780's, nocturnal
searches were considered unexceptional and were permitted in various contexts in America.
By the 1780's, however, the permissibility of nocturnal entries had evolved, and by the time
the Fourth Amendment was ratified, every state except Delaware had barred nighttime
searches. See Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1346, 1509 (citing statutes).
176 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 643-45
(describing common-law commentators' views on when homes could be entered to conduct
an arrest); Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1514-1516 (noting that although "hot pursuit" and
other "exigent circumstances" generally justified entering a home without a warrant,
"[a]rrests subsequent to the crime, on the other hand, required a warrant").
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government officers wanted to enter a home to conduct a search. 177 In other
words, a warrantless search of a home was out-of-bounds, so to speak. As
Professor Davies explains, the common law "did not identify any positive
justification for a warrantless search of a house-a silence that meant there
was no such justification." 178 American law eventually incorporated these
common-law rules, and the Fourth Amendment "represented an American
1 79
extension of the English tradition that a man's house was his castle."'
The type of official intrusions eighteenth-century Americans condemned
involved entries and searches of private homes. By contrast, the police
intrusion in McArthur involved seizing a home and preventing the homeowner
from re-entering. This distinction, however, might not make a difference to a
Framing-era lawyer. Although Justice Breyer's opinion downplays the point,
at stake in McArthur was the authority of the police to conduct a warrantless
seizure of an occupied dwelling. 180 McArthur was inside his home when the
police knocked on his front door. 181 The justification for seizing McArthur's
177 See Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, supra note 9, at 645 (noting

that a "warrant was even more critical for justifying searches of houses than for entering the
house to make an arrest"); Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1521 (pointing out that
"[c]ontemporary federal legislation acknowledged no situations that permitted a man's
dwelling house to be searched without a warrant, although it did sanction warrantless
searches of workplaces and of ships").
178 Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 646 (citation
omitted).
' Cuddihy & Hardy, supra note 173, at 400. Cuddihy and Hardy go on to note that the
"requirement that all search warrants be specific, the heart of the Fourth Amendment,
accordingly enlargedthe tradition's scope, for it controlled searches by the government to a
degree never previously attempted." Id. (emphasis added).
180See Bradley, supra note 155, at 70.
181This description of the facts is taken from the opinion of the Appellate Court of
Illinois. 713 N.E.2d at 94. As noted above, Justice Breyer's statement of the facts and
holding below glosses over McArthur's presence inside his home before the start of his
encounter with the police. See supra note 159. Professor LaFave states that "since
[McArthur] apparently exited his premises voluntarily and not in response to any
inappropriate conduct by the police, this is not a case in which the Payton arrest-warrantfor-in-premise arrest rule could be invoked." LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 6.5 at 82 (Supp.
2002) (citations omitted). While it may be true that no "unlawful" police conduct caused
McArthur to answer his front door, the appropriateness of the police knocking on
McArthur's door does not undo the fact that McArthur was inside his home when the police
knocked. Moreover, the "voluntariness" of McArthur's presence outside his home is
unclear. The Illinois appellate court explained that the supervising officer "did not recall
whether he told [McArthur] to come out of the trailer or if [McArthur] came out on his
own." 713 N.E.2d at 94. If the officer told McArthur to exit his trailer, McArthur's
presence outside was not voluntary. Finally, even assuming that the officer did not order
McArthur outside, McArthur was unlikely to know, as he stood at or inside his front door,
that the Fourth Amendment may recognize his "right" to withdraw or retreat into his
premises. Compare LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 6.1(e) at 258 (contending "that if the person
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home was a "plausible claim" of exigent circumstances. 182 Although the
police did not conduct a forcible search of McArthur's home, the police
seizure certainly breached the security McArthur enjoyed in his home. The
Fourth Amendment guarantees the right "to be secure" in one's home against
security in one's home
unreasonable seizures,1 83 and during the Framing-era,
184
law.
common
the
of
principle
fundamental
a
was
to be arrested answers the door but then, upon seeing the police, withdraws or retreats into
the premises to thwart arrest, a warrantless entry should not be permitted (absent, of course,
a pre-existing exigent circumstances or 'hot pursuit' justification)" (citations omitted)), with
Tracey Maclin, Seeing the Constitutionfrom the Backseat of a Police Squad Car,70 B.U. L.
REv. 543, 578 n.117 (1990) (reviewing H. RICHARD UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL (1988))
(arguing that the typical arrestee will not be aware of "his right (which the Supreme Court
has yet to announce, and is not likely to announce anytime soon) to thwart the arrest").
182 Although the lower court concluded that "no exigent circumstances here justified [the
police] entry into [McArthur's] trailer," People v. McArthur, 713 N.E.2d at 98, Justice
Breyer stated that the warrantless seizure of the trailer "involve[d] a plausible claim of
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances."' 531 U.S.
at 331 (citations omitted). Of course, the Court's precedents have not recognized "plausible
claim[s]" of exigency. If police have probable cause to believe that a warrantless search or
seizure is necessary to prevent a felon from escaping or to prevent the imminent destruction
of evidence, then a warrantless intrusion is permitted. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387
U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (recognizing the authority of police to enter and conduct a warrantless
search of a home where there is probable cause to believe that an armed robber had entered
the home a few minutes earlier). If probable cause of exigent circumstances does not exist,
a warrantless intrusion is unconstitutional. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 101
(1990) (affirming lower court finding that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify a
warrantless entry to effect the arrest of a suspect wanted in a murder-robbery investigation).
Although the Court has not yet decided whether exigency is a question of law or a question
of fact, Olson suggests it is a question of law. See id.; cf Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S.
690, 699 (1996) (holding that probable cause and reasonable suspicion determinations
should be reviewed de novo). A "plausible claim" of exigency is a concept unknown in the
Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and Justice Breyer made no effort to explain it.
In contrast, Justice Souter explicitly stated his view that an exigency justified the police
conduct in McArthur. See 531 U.S. at 337 (Souter, J., concurring) (stating that the
"probability of destruction [of evidence] in anticipation of a warrant exemplifies the kind of
present risk that undergirds the accepted exigent circumstances exception to the general
warrant requirement").
83 In pertinent part, the Amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated." U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added). Professor Clancy has cogently argued
that the right to be secure is the equivalent of the right to exclude the government. See
Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect: Property, Privacy, or
Security? 33 WAKE FoREST L. REV. 307, 356 (1998) [hereinafter Clancy, What Does the
Fourth Amendment Protect] ("This ability to exclude is so essential to the exercise of the
right to be secure that it is proper to say that it is equivalent to the right-the right to be
secure is the right to exclude.").
184 John Adams, in his notes of James Otis' argument in the Writs of Assistance Case,
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Indeed, it is difficult to reconcile the warrantless police seizure in McArthur
with "the unique status accorded the house at common law."'1 85 Under the
common law, the castle doctrine provided that "a man's house is his castle; and
while he is quiet, he is as well guarded as a prince in his castle."'1 86 Whatever
"sweet Security" and "delightfull Tranquillity" 187 McArthur may have enjoyed
in his home was most certainly disturbed when the police summoned him to
his front door and told him that he could not re-enter his home unless an officer
accompanied him, effectively seizing the home as a result. It is thus very
difficult to imagine the Framers casually approving the police seizure in
McArthur. Although the "balancing" analysis utilized in McArthur was
unknown in the Framing-era, 188 if asked to express a view on whether the
warrantless seizure of McArthur's home was reasonable, it is likely-given
their strong views on the sanctity of the home-that the Framers would have
"placed a higher value on the sanctity of the ordinary citizen's home"' 89 than
on the discovery and prosecution of two petty misdemeanors.190

quotes Otis as saying: "This Writ is against the fundamental Principles of Law. The
Privilege of House. A Man, who is quiet, is as secure in his House, as a Prince in his
Castle .... Now one of the most essential branches of English liberty, is the freedom of
one's house." M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASES 317, 344 (1978). See also
Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, supra note 9, at 642 (noting that "[t]he
castle doctrine announced the householder's entitlement to be left alone in his house-what
John Adams called 'that strong Protection, that sweet Security, that delightful Tranquillity
which the Laws have thus secured to [an Englishman] in his own House' (citation
omitted)); Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect, supra note 183, at 362
(arguing that "[d]efining security as having the right to exclude has historical roots and
meaning" because "the Framers lived in a time that equated security with the ability to
exclude").
85 Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, supra note 9, at 642.
186 Smith, supra note 184, at 344.
187 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 137 (L. Kinvin & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965).
188 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 591
(explaining that "historical sources show that framing-era law did not recognize any
'reasonableness' standard for arrests and searches"); cf Thomas, supra note 48, at 173
(noting that "the Framers were not concerned with the government's interest in solving
crime," because "[w]hile we today fear criminals, the Framers feared the central
government").
189 McArthur, 531 U.S. at 340 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Illinois judges
"placed a higher value on the sanctity of the ordinary citizen's home than on the prosecution
of this petty offense," and that they "correctly viewed that interest-whether the home be a
humble cottage, a secondhand trailer, or a stately mansion-as one meriting the most
serious constitutional protection" (citation omitted)).
190 My point is not that a search warrant for evidence of a petty misdemeanor could not
have issued under the common law. Rather, I suggest that the history of the Fourth
Amendment indicates that the Framers placed a greater value on the security of a citizen's
home against warrantless intrusions than they did on making criminal evidence available for
seizure.
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Justice Breyer and the rest of the Court also ignored a second fundamental
element of Fourth Amendment history that might have "inform[ed]" 191 their
analysis in McArthur. As Professor Davies points out, "[a]t common law, a
search or arrest was presumed an unlawful trespass unless 'justified.' Thus,
law enforcement authority as such consisted simply of those justifications for
192
arrests or searches recognized by the common-law treatises and cases."
Conversely, "the absence of an affirmative statement of authority was
[generally] understood to mean there was no authority" to conduct a search or
93
seizure. 1
I have found no positive authority--existing in 1791-recognizing an
officer's authority to seize an occupied home pending the issuance of a search
warrant. Neither the State of Illinois nor its amici identified any common-law
sources or cases authorizing the type of seizure involved in McArthur.194 This
suggests that when the Fourth Amendment was ratified, a constable or sheriff
had no legal authority to seize an occupied home without a warrant. Thus,
under the first prong of Houghton's two-prong standard for judging the legality
of a police intrusion in McArthur, there is substantial support for the
conclusion that the challenged police conduct was "regarded as an
unlawful... seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed." 195
In sum, Justice Breyer and the rest of the Court not only failed to
acknowledge Houghton's two-step standard, but they also ignored both the
Framers' views on the sanctity of the home and the common-law rule that a
peace officer could not conduct a seizure unless authorized by positive law. Of
course, even if the McArthur Court had considered history, it might still have
upheld the challenged seizure for reasons unrelated to the Fourth
Amendment's history. 196 Whether McArthur should have prevailed on the
concurring) (noting that
"I'Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (Breyer, J.,
"history is meant to inform, but not automatically to determine, the answer to a Fourth
Amendment question").
192 Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, supra note 9, at 624-25 (citation
omitted).
193Id. at 646 n.273; see also id. at 737 n.543 (observing that "[a]t common law,
intrusions were judged unlawful unless they were positively justified").
194None of the briefs filed by the state and its amici mentioned the history of the Fourth
Amendment generally, or the common-law rule that constables and sheriffs could search or
seize only where positive law authorized the intrusion specifically. See Brief for Petitioner,
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (No. 99-1132); Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (No. 991132); Brief Amicus Curiae of the States in Support of Petitioner, Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326 (2001) (No. 99-1132).
'9'Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299.
196 For example, Justice Souter asserted that the "legitimacy" of the seizure "follows
from the law's strong preference for warrants, which underlies the rule that a search with a
warrant has a stronger claim to justification on later, judicial review than a search without
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merits of his constitutional claim is debatable. Nonetheless, there are
substantial arguments to support the conclusion that the police intrusion in
McArthur was inconsistent with the values and norms associated with the
Framers' understanding of what the Fourth Amendment protected. McArthur
involved a warrantless intrusion that certainly interfered with the security that
McArthur enjoyed while inside his home. Also, the police conduct in
McArthur was not approved by the positive law in existence in 1791. These
are sound reasons to believe that the intrusion would be "regarded as an
unlawful ...seizure under the common law when the Amendment was
framed."' 97 Yet, McArthur did not discuss the history of the Fourth
Amendment, nor did it explain why historical considerations were irrelevant to
the outcome of the case. Houghton unequivocally stated that history is the
starting point in resolving in all Fourth Amendment issues, and McArthur's
refusal to acknowledge or discuss relevant common-law principles shows that
history matters only when the Court wants it to matter.
The Court's inattention to history can also be seen in Arkansas v.
Sullivan.198 Sullivan is another case that generated scant news coverage, 199
despite the fact that it upheld the authority of police officers to conduct
pretextual arrests for traffic offenses, which is a significant power for law
enforcement officers. An officer stopped Kenneth Sullivan for speeding.200
After receiving Sullivan's license, the officer recalled law enforcement
intelligence that Sullivan had been involved with narcotics. 20 1 When Sullivan
opened his car door, the officer noticed a rusted roofing hatchet on the
floorboard, and subsequently arrested him for speeding, driving without
registration and insurance documentation, possession of a weapon (the roofing
hatchet) and improper tint on his windshield. 20 2 An inventory search of the car
disclosed narcotics. The trial court granted Sullivan's suppression motion on
the ground that "the arrest was pretextual and made for the purpose of

one." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 338 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring) (citations
omitted). In other words, the warrant preference rule justified the warrantless seizure. See
id. ("The law can hardly raise incentives to obtain a warrant without giving the police a fair
chance to take their probable cause to a magistrate and get one."). The Court might have
also concluded that history did not provide a sufficiently clear answer on the legality of a
warrantless seizure of an occupied home and resolved the case by using a balancing analysis
similar to the approach utilized by Justice Breyer.
197Houghton, 526 U.S. at 299.
198532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam).
199Although there was no mention of Sullivan in The Los Angeles Times, The New
York Times, or The Washington Post, there was one brief article in an Arkansas newspaper
shortly after the Supreme Court decided the case, Supreme Court Upends Arkansas Ruling,
THE ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, May 30, 2001, at B2.
200 532 U.S. at 769.
201 Id. at 770.
202 Id.
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searching Sullivan's vehicle for evidence of crime. '20 3 The Arkansas Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's ruling, 20 4 and held that arresting a motorist for a
traffic offense in order to conduct a search of the vehicle for evidence of crime
violated the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement. The Court
reversed this ruling, holding that an officer's subjective motives are irrelevant
20 5
in determining the constitutionality of an arrest based on probable cause.
For the Court, Sullivan involved a simple application of the holding in
Whren v. United States.20 6 In Whren, a unanimous Court ruled that an officer's
subjective motives are irrelevant in determining the validity of a traffic stop
based on probable cause. 20 7 That Whren involved a traffic stop, rather than a
custodial arrest, was apparently unimportant to the Sullivan Court. Sullivan
thus established that an ordinary arrest based on probable cause is immune
from constitutional challenge. 20 8 In reaching this determination, the Sullivan

203 State v. Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d 551, 552 (Ark. 2000).
204 The

Arkansas Supreme Court initially ruled in a unanimous opinion that the search of

the vehicle could not be justified as a valid inventory search or search incident to arrest
because the officer's motive for the search was pretextual. See State v. Sullivan, 11 S.W.3d
526, 527-28 (Ark. 2000). The state then petitioned for a rehearing, arguing that this ruling
was inconsistent with Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), which held that an
officer's subjective intentions are irrelevant if there is probable cause for a traffic stop. In
its second ruling, a divided Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that Whren did not apply to
pretextual arrests for traffic violations. See Sullivan, 16 S.W.3d at 552-53 ("In sum, we will
not give carte blanche approval for all pretextual arrests for traffic violations, as the State
would have us do ... [but instead] will decide the reasonableness of the arrest and search on
a case-by-case basis, as the Whren decision makes clear.").
205 532 U.S. at 771-72.

206 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
207 Although Whren was a unanimous ruling, the decision generated extensive criticism.

See Maclin, supra note 143, at 402 n.17 (citing numerous sources).
208 Without saying so expressly, Sullivan establishes, as did Whren, a per se rule. See
Sklansky, Traffic Stops, supra note 45, at 297. Professor Sklansky notes:
[Whren] on its face affirmatively prohibits an analysis of reasonableness of a search or
seizure based on "all the circumstances surrounding the encounter." It does so by
cordoning off an entire category of 'circumstances' that might ordinarily be thought
pertinent to the reasonableness of an officer's actions and making them irrelevant as a
matter of law.
Id. (citations omitted). Although the Court may have viewed Sullivan as a simple
application of the rule announced in Whren, Professor LaFave notes that the facts in
Sullivan raise a new issue that the Sullivan Court did not recognize. Since Whren's holding
does not apply to searches made without probable cause (e.g., an inventory search), see 517
U.S. at 811-12,
does it not follow that the defendant should be able to question not only whether there
was a pretext in the decision to conduct the inventory but also whether there was a
pretext in making the arrest in the first place in order [to] get custody of the car so as to
have a basis for the inventory?
LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 1.4 at 26 (Supp. 2002).
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Court did not mention the history of the Fourth Amendment. 20 9
Like the ruling in McArthur, Sullivan's inattention to history did not mean

that history was irrelevant to the result in that case. In fact, Justice Ginsburg's
brief concurring opinion alluded to why the Fourth Amendment's history was
germane to the issue in Sullivan. Justice Ginsburg noted that the "Arkansas
''2 10
Supreme Court was moved by a concern rooted in the Fourth Amendment.
Upholding Sullivan's arrest and the subsequent search of his car would "accord
police officers disturbing discretion to intrude on individuals' liberty and
privacy."'21' Although she recognized that immunizing pretextual arrests for
traffic offenses from constitutional scrutiny may grant police "disturbing
discretion" to intrude on citizens' liberty and privacy interests, Justice
Ginsburg did not draw a connection between checking police discretion to
search and seize, on the one hand, and the history of the Fourth Amendment on
the other. By failing to make that connection, Justice Ginsburg and the rest of
the Court once again ignored a fundamental aspect of the Fourth Amendment's
history.
Sullivan and Whren ignored history when determining the constitutionality
of a pretextual traffic stop or arrest. Had the Court consulted history, it might
have found that affording police officers such powers conflicts with the "vision
underlying"2 1 2 the Fourth Amendment. The Court in both Sullivan and Whren
dealt with the difficult and central question that surrounds most modem search
and seizure cases: How much police discretion is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures? 2 13 The
209 On one level, it is eisy to understand why the Sullivan Court would ignore history.
For the Court, the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court was "flatly contrary" to Whren's
holding. 532 U.S. at 771. Whren was authored by Justice Scalia, the chief proponent of the
view that common-law rules should control search and seizure doctrine, yet Justice Scalia
ignored history in his opinion in Whren. See Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1759
(noting that Justice Scalia "said not a word about the common law" in Whren). The Court's
distaste for criminal procedure rules that require an assessment of police subjective motives,
see 517 U.S. at 814, and its preference for workable, bright-line rules, dictated the result in
Whren. See id. at 817 (explaining that while the "reasonableness" requirement of the Fourth
Amendment generally involves a balancing of all relevant factors, "the result of that
balancing is not in doubt where the search or seizure is based upon probable cause").
Apparently, the Court believes that, in this context, a historical inquiry is pointless.
210 532 U.S. at 772 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
211

Id. at 772-73.

212 TRIBE, supra note 13, at 1261.

Regarding Article IV's Privileges and Immunities
Clause, Professor Tribe explained that:
[T]he vision underlying the constitutional plan-that the states not war with one
another by discriminating against one another's citizens without good reason-should
nonetheless be regarded as giving rise to the dominant meaning of the clause whether
or not the framers or ratifiers had a more limited set of examples in mind.
Id.
213 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 747
(pointing out that "[v]iewed pragmatically, the central issue in modem Fourth Amendment
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essence of the defendants' argument in Whren was "that probable cause as to a
minor traffic violation can be so easily come by that its existence provides no
general assurance against arbitrary police action. '21 4 Though the defendants'
concerns were similar in both cases, the stakes were higher in Sullivan than in
Whren. The reason for this is that Sullivan allows an officer to rely on the
same probable cause that authorized the traffic stop in Whren to effect a
custodial arrest, a seizure obviously more intrusive than a traffic stop. In sum,
the defendants in both cases argued that the Fourth Amendment imposes
restraints on the police where their discretionary powers unduly threaten the
liberty and privacy interests of millions of motorists. This argument-that the
Fourth Amendment was designed to check discretionary police power-is an
argument rooted in the history of the Amendment.
The history of the Fourth Amendment plainly demonstrates that the
Framers' immediate concern was "banning legislative authorization of general
warrants for searches of houses or arrests of persons. ' 21 5 Although prohibiting
general warrants and writs of assistance was the foremost object of the
Amendment, the Framers and Ratifiers also had "concerns andjudgments [that
were] implied in the decision to establish a constitutional restriction upon a
category of official activity generically described as 'searches and seizures'
' '2 16
and known to include the messengers' and customs officers' rummagings.
One such concern was over the discretionary power of law enforcement
officers to intrude on the privacy and security of citizens. Although the
Amendment's text bans only general warrants, the "larger purpose for which
the Framers adopted the text [was] to curb the exercise of discretionary
'217
authority by officers.

doctrine is the degree to which it is possible and/or desirable to constrain discretionary
police authority by a regime of rules, or at least partial rules"); David A. Harris, Car Wars:
The FourthAmendment's Death on the Highway, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 578 (1998).
Harris recognizes that "[p]olice need discretion to do their work; indeed, it is impossible to
imagine eliminating it. The questions are how much discretion comports with the Fourth
Amendment, and how this discretion might be channeled most wisely." Id. (citation
omitted); cf Tracey Maclin, Central Meaning, supra note 12, at 201 (asserting that "[tlhe
constitutional lodestar for understanding the Fourth Amendment is not an ad hoc
reasonableness standard; rather, the central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of
police power and discretion" (citation omitted)).
214 LAFAVE, supra note 37, § 1.4, at 18 (Supp. 2002).
215 Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 555; see also
Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1545-48.
Professor Amsterdam has observed that
"[i]ndisputably the 'searches and seizures' on the agenda at the time the fourth amendment
was written were the rummagings of the English messengers and colonial customs officers.
We can construct with some fair confidence what 'the framers' thought of those."
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 398.
216 Amsterdam, supranote 2, at 364 (emphasis added).
217 Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 556; cf id. at
578 (remarking that "[clommon law authorities repeatedly gave a consistent reason for
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Of course, one could argue that because the text of the Amendment only
prohibits general warrants and because peace officers in 1791 were permitted
to make warrantless arrests, there is no basis for a constitutional argument that
forbids officers from conducting warrantless stops or arrests supported by
probable cause. 218 Under this view, the discretionary power exercised in
Whren and Sullivan would not have been "regarded as an unlawful search or
seizure under the common law when the Amendment was framed. '219 This
conclusion-namely, that the Framers were unconcemed with the discretionary
powers of officers to make warrantless intrusions---distorts the Framers'
thinking and ignores the broader purposes of the Amendment.
Regarding the Framers' intentions, Professor Davies recently documented
that Framing-era law did not encourage or tolerate discretionary searches and
seizures. Davies acknowledges "that common law sometimes permitted
warrantless arrests or searches." 220 Davies, however, notes that the crucial
question is not whether the common law permitted warrantless intrusions, but
"how broadly" it defined the powers of officers to effect warrantless searches
and seizures. 221 According to Davies, "the Framers were not unconcerned
about warrantless intrusions because they had any confidence in officers'

condemning general warrants: if such warrants had been permitted, they would have
conferred on ordinary officers discretionaryauthority to arrest or even to search houses");
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 412 (asserting that "[u]nder the fourth amendment, even where
the initial justification for a search was determined by a magistrate, executive discretion in
its execution was to be curbed by the requirement of particularity of description in the
warrant of the items subject to seizure").
218 The traditional view has been that the Framers recognized the constitutionality of a
warrantless arrest supported by probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S.
411,418 (1976). The Court in Watson declared that:
[The] cases construing the Fourth Amendment thus reflect the ancient common-law
rule that a peace officer was permitted to arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor or
felony committed in his presence as well as for a felony not committed in his presence
if there was reasonable ground for making the arrest.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment FirstPrinciples, 107
HARV. L. REV. 757, 764 (1994) (noting that at "common law, arrests-seizures of personscould take place without warrants in a variety of circumstances" according to "the major
founding-era commentators" (citation omitted)). This traditional view of arrest doctrine,
however, has been challenged by Professor Davies, who asserts that:
[C]ommon-law arrest doctrine was generally indisposed.towards warrantless arrests
unless they served a clear need. Because the common-law writers did not place much
faith in the judgment of ordinary officers, and because they generally rejected the idea
that 'freemen' should be subject to any exercise of discretionary authority by ordinary
officers, there was a strong preference that a decision to arrest be made whenever
possible by a justice of the peace or other magistrate, rather than by an ordinary officer.
Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,supra note 9, at 321 (citation omitted).
219 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999).
220 Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourthAmendment, supra note 9, at 576.
221 Id.
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judgment-rather, they were unconcerned with warrantless intrusions because
they did not perceive ordinary officers as possessing any significant
222
discretionary authority at common law to initiate arrests or searches."
Davies and other scholars have found that the Amendment's history
"demonstrates a deep-rooted distrust and even disdain for the judgment of
ordinary officers. '223 Writings and speeches from the Framing-era reveal that
224
many Americans were highly suspicious of law enforcement powers.
"Given that distrust, it is wholly implausible that the Framers would have
approved of broad use of warrantless intrusions, because such intrusions would
225
necessarily have rested solely on the officers' own judgment."
Affording police officers "disturbing discretion"2 26 to stop and arrest
motorists for traffic offenses also undermines the general purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. To permit pretextual traffic stops and arrests for traffic
offenses "is to license arbitrary exercises of official discretion similar to those
notoriously authorized in the eighteenth century by general warrants and writs
of assistance ....
-227 Such stops and arrests are arbitrary intrusions because
they may be conducted for reasons entirely unrelated to traffic enforcement.
The officers who initiate these intrusions may well lack the requisite level of
suspicion required to stop and search for criminal activity, and these minor
traffic offenses may be used as a pretext to facilitate the discovery of illegal
narcotics or other criminal evidence. 228 Thus, pretextual stops and arrests

Id. at 578.
Id. at 582; see also Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1127 (describing pre-Constitution
essays of American writers complaining about officers who enforced writs of assistance);
222

223

NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE

92-93 (1937) (quoting Patrick Henry's speeches at the
Virginia Convention in which Henry warned against the discretionary search powers of
federal sheriffs); Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1805 (stating that "American
merchants and landowners objected to virtually any intrusions on their persons or property
by officers of the Crown" and that "customs officers were denounced as 'dirty,' 'insolent,'
impertinent,' 'rude,' etc." (citations omitted)); Kamisar, supra note 21, at 575 (remarking
that "the colonists condemned writs of assistance because such writs 'no more controlled
official discretion than would a statute that simply permitted warrantless searches' (citation
omitted)).
224 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 577-82
(discussing commentaries from judges and various other authorities that expressed concern
over allowing common officers to have discretionary authority).
225 Id. at 582 (citation omitted).
226 Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
227 Sklansky, Traffic Stops, supra note 45, at 286 (citation omitted).
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

228 See generally DAVID

A. HARRIS, PROFILES IN INJUSTICE: WHY RACIAL PROFILING

CANNOT WORK (2002) (systematically describing how police use pretextual traffic stops and
other enforcement methods as devices for racial and ethnic profiling); DAVID COLE, No
EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

41 (1999)

(articulating that the "net of traffic regulations is so wide that everyone will fall within it,
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mirror a troublesome aspect of general warrants and writs of assistance. They
are "conducted at the discretion executive officials, who may act despotically
and capriciously in the exercise of the power to search and seize. This latter
concern runs against arbitrary searches and seizures: it condemns the petty
'229
tyranny of unregulated rummagers.
Finally, the Sullivan Court's reaffirmation of the rule that all arrests based
on probable cause are per se reasonable is not a sound reflection of legal
history. In fact, only "the myth of a long-standing probable cause standard" 230
supports the Court's conclusion. Over twenty years ago, Justice White
acknowledged that during the period when the American colonists rebelled
against British search and seizure rules, "the validity of any arrest on bare
suspicion-even one occurring outside the home-was open to question. '23'
Justice White's statement, though literally true, understates the significant
restraints imposed on a peace officer's authority to conduct a warrantless
arrest.
When the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the common law authorized
warrantless arrests in only limited circumstances.2 32 The Framers did not
and as a result police officers have virtually unfettered discretion to decide whom to stop");
Tracey Maclin, The Fourth Amendment on the Freeway, 3 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 117,
170-77 (2001) (describing lower court rulings that allow a police officer, during a routine
traffic stop, to question a detained motorist about matters unrelated to the traffic stop).
229 Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 411; see also Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant
of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest
for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 221, 254 (1989) (noting that the Amendment was
intended to bar "the arbitrary and indiscriminate searches permitted by general warrants and
writs of assistance" and that "[t]he power to search permitted officers when they arrest for
minor traffic offenses is essentially the same delegation of discretion").
230 Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 640 n.252
(noting that various cases and commentaries have treated the probable cause standard as a
historical doctrine when in fact it was not the common-law standard for an arrest).
231 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 607 (1980) (White, J., dissenting).
232 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 627-34
(explaining that in 1791, American law authorized a warrantless arrest in the following
circumstances: (1) if an offense was committed in the officer's presence; (2) if the person
arrested was actually guilty of committing a felony, although not committed in the officer's
presence; or (3) if the person arrested was actually guilty of a felony and there was
reasonable cause to believe the person had committed it); Davies, Law-And-Order
Originalism, supra note 9, at 321 n.244 (explaining the "felony in fact" requirement of
common-law arrest doctrine); cf id. at 337. Professor Davies explains that:
[B]ecause framing-era law severely limited warrantless arrest and search authority, and
because there had been no comparable prerevolutionary controversy over arrest
standards, the state Framers were content to constitutionalize arrest standards and other
facets of criminal procedure by adopting provisions that simply invoked the broader,
settled conception of common-law criminal procedure traditionally denoted as 'the law
of the land' when they wrote state declarations of rights and constitutions. For the
same reasons, the federal Framers were content to constitutionalize the
noncontroversial aspects of pretrial criminal procedure-including the standards for
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experience constables and sheriffs routinely arresting people based solely on
the officer's judgment that an offense may have been committed. 233 Instead,
"the Framers perceived warrant authority as the salient mode of arrest and
search authority. '234 The modem, so-called "probable cause" rule that
authorizes any arrest regardless of whether the arrestee was actually guilty of a
felony, did not exist in 1791, and was not recognized until an 1827 British
decision established the rule. 235 Thus, "the recognition of probable cause alone
as a justification for a warrantless arrest marked a drastic departure from the
common-law regime familiar to the Framers. ' 236 Accordingly, the Sullivan
Court's reaffirmation of the earlier-established rule that probable cause is
sufficient authority to justify a warrantless arrest was based neither on common
law that existed in 1791 nor on the larger goals served by the Fourth
237
Amendment.
As with the discussion of McArthur, the point here is not to assert that the

arrest-as 'due process of law' in the Fifth Amendment.
Id. (citations omitted).
233 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 640
(observing that "[t]he Framers understood that justifications for warrantless arrests and
accompanying searches were quite limited" so "they did not perceive the peace officer as
possessing any significant ex officio discretionary arrest or search authority").
234 Id. at 641 ("As James Wilson put it when opening his 1790-91 lecture on arrest
authority, 'A warrant is the first step usually taken for [the apprehension of a criminal]."'
(alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
235 See Beckwith v. Philby, 6 B. & C. 635, 108 Eng. Rep. 585, 586 (1827) (holding that a
constable having reasonable or probable cause to suspect that someone has committed a
felony may arrest the person, even if he or she did not actually commit a felony); see
generally Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant,49 HARV. L.
REv. 566, 575-77 (1936) (describing the facts of Beckwith and its holding); Davies,
Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 636-39 (explaining the holding
in Beckwith, its adoption in American courts, and its effect on the enlargement of officers'
authority and on the number of warrantless arrests and searches); Sklansky, Common Law,
supra note 1, at 1802 (arguing that because this rule was announced in 1827, it does not
reflect the common law during the framing era).
236 Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 639.
237 Putting historical considerations aside, the modem Court's belief that probable cause
of a traffic violation adequately checks police discretion "blinks at reality." LAFAVE, supra
note 37, § 1.4 at 23 (Supp. 2002). Because probable cause of a traffic offense is easily
obtained or "manufactured" by the police, a per se approach that permits stops or arrests
based on probable cause provides negligible protection against arbitrary police intrusions.
"Rather than protect motorists, in this context, probable cause acts as a lever to initiate an
arbitrary seizure, and then insulates the decision from judicial review." Tracey Maclin,
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REv. 334, 377 (1998) (citation omitted).
Viewed this way, a pretextual traffic stop or arrest operates like a writ of assistance or
general warrant. Officers have unlimited discretion to decide who to target and search. See
Salken, supra note 229, at 254 (arguing that the power to arrest for a minor traffic violation
is the type of evil the Amendment was designed to prevent).
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Framers' concern with police discretion is indisputable proof that they would
have opposed the results in Whren and Sullivan. The Framers' view on the

constitutionality of pretextual stops and arrests for traffic offenses is
unknowable. By the same token, history does not establish that the results in
Whren and Sullivan are undeniably wrong. History does show, however, that a
"paramount purpose of the fourth amendment is to prohibit arbitrary searches
and seizures as well as unjustified searches and seizures. '238 Although some
members of the Court seemed reluctant to recognize the point in Sullivan,
upholding pretextual arrests for traffic offenses does indeed confer a
"disturbing discretion" on police officers. 239 The reasoning of Sullivan is
noteworthy because none of the Justices acknowledged that affording police
officers this much discretion conflicts with a larger purpose underlying the
Fourth Amendment, namely controlling the discretionary authority of law
enforcement officers. 240 By ignoring the Framers' concern about checking
police discretion, the Sullivan Court thus missed an opportunity to have history
inform its Fourth Amendment analysis.
III. MISJUDGING THE LESSONS HISTORY TEACHES
ABOUT THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Of the eleven Fourth Amendment cases decided on the merits in the 2000
and 2001 Terms, Atwater v. City of Lago Vista241 was the only case in which
history seemed to influence the Court's judgment. Indeed, Justice Souter
devoted nearly twenty pages 242 of his thirty-three page opinion to examining
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 417 (citation omitted).
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
240 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 736-37
(asserting that the Framers "banned general warrants in order to prevent the officer from
exercising discretionary authority" and that "framing-era common law resisted the sort of
discretionary authority that 'reasonableness' analysis confers on modem officers" (citation
omitted)). Professor Davies goes on to explain that the "reasonableness" model
accords the modem police officer far greater authority to arrest or search than the
Framers ever intended or anticipated. It also inclines decisions toward a constant
expansion of discretionary authority. The generalized-reasonableness construction
reflects an endorsement of government power over citizens that is fundamentally at
odds with the Framers' more libertarian view of the inherent rights of "freemen."
Id. at 737-38 (citations omitted); see also Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,supra note
9, at 398-99. Professor Davies notes that a reasonableness standard
has been [the] basis upon which modem decisions have approved of discretionary
police authority. However, the authentic history is that the Framers meant for the
Fourth Amendment to reinforce the common-law principle that discretionaryarrest or
search should not be conferred on ordinary peace officers. Indeed, the reason the
Framers feared and banned general warrants was precisely because such warrants
purported to confer discretionary authority on the officers who held them.
Id.
241 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
242 Id. at 326-45.
238

239
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the history of warrantless arrests for minor offenses. Atwater involved
undisputed facts. An officer stopped Gail Atwater while she was driving her
small children home. 243 Neither Atwater nor her children were wearing their
seatbelts when the officer stopped them.244 Under Texas law, police have the
discretion to arrest or cite any person found violating the traffic code. 245 The
officer arrested Atwater, who subsequently pleaded no contest to misdemeanor
seatbelt offenses and paid a fifty dollar fine.246 Atwater later sued the city and
the arresting officer, claiming that her arrest violated the Fourth
Amendment. 247 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc,
ruled that the seizure was reasonable because probable cause supported
248

Atwater's arrest.
The issue confronting the Court in Atwater was "whether the Fourth
Amendment, either by incorporating common-law restrictions on misdemeanor
arrests or otherwise, limits police officers' authority to arrest without warrant
for minor criminal offenses.

' 249

In evaluating Atwater's claim that the

common law generally prohibited a warrantless arrest for a non-violent
misdemeanor offense, Justice Souter conceded that Atwater's historical
argument was "by no means insubstantial. ' 250 Still, Atwater's historical thesis
did not ultimately persuade Justice Souter and the rest of the majority. In a
five to four vote, the Court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment, as
originally understood, [did not] forb[id] peace officers to arrest without a
warrant for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the
peace. ' 251 Thus, in the Court's opinion, Atwater's arrest would have been
Id. at 323.
Id. at 323-24.
245 See id. at 323 ("Texas law expressly authorizes '[a]ny peace officer [to] arrest without
warrant a person found committing a violation' of these seatbelt laws... although it permits
police to issue citations in lieu of arrest . . . ." (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
246 Id. at 324.
247 Id. at 325.
241 See id,
at 325-26.
249 Id. at 326.
250 532 U.S. at 327. In a pre-Atwater article, Professor William Schroeder concluded that
the common law permitted warrantless misdemeanor arrests "only for offenses that involved
a breach of the peace and that were committed in the presence of the person making the
arrest. In addition, the arrest had to made at the time of the offense or as soon thereafter as
possible." William A. Schroeder, Warrantless Misdemeanor Arrests and the Fourth
Amendment, 58 Mo. L. REv. 771, 774-75 (1993).
251 532 U.S. at 340. Justice Souter's framing of the issue distorts Atwater's argument
and the common-law rule on misdemeanor arrests. According to Professor Davies:
Atwater had not sought a blanket prohibition against warrantless arrests for nonbreach
offenses. Likewise, the four dissenting justices did not adopt that position. Both
Atwater and the dissenters argued that there should be a general rule against such
arrests, subject to exception if there were some specific unusual need for prompt arrest.
That is what the framing-era sources showed.
243

244
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considered reasonable at the time of the Framing. 252
In the Atwater opinion, Justice Souter extensively examines pre-Founding
and post-Founding common-law rules on misdemeanor arrests.253 While
discussing this history, he makes a number of significant observations about
the interaction of history and modem Fourth Amendment doctrine. For
example, Justice Souter begins his historical analysis by acknowledging that
"eminent authorities" of the common law supported Atwater's position that the
common law restricted warrantless misdemeanor arrests to actual breaches of
the peace. 254 However, Justice Souter noted that the "great commentators were
not unanimous," and that "there is also considerable evidence of a broader
conception of common-law misdemeanor arrest authority unlimited by any
breach-of-the-peace condition. '255 Justice Souter highlighted Sir Matthew
Hale's conclusion that a constable had the inherent authority to arrest without a
'256
warrant "for breach of the peace and some misdemeanors, less than felony.
Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism, supra note 9, at 318 (citation omitted). More
importantly, Justice Souter's description of the authority of peace officers to conduct
misdemeanor arrests under the common law was highly selective. The following critique by
Professor Davies reveals the importance of the manner in which the Justices formulate
questions in search and seizure cases:
If one asks whether there were any framing-era sources that supported unlimited
discretionary warrantless arrest authority for even the most minor nonbreach
offenses-that is, whether any historical sources supported the ruling the Atwater
majority actually made-the answer is plainly negative. All of the framing-era
authorities limited arrest authority to something less-a good deal less-than all
nonbreach misdemeanors.
None permitted across-the-board misdemeanor arrest
authority the way Atwater's holding does ....The bottom line is that Souter's own
framing-era evidence was inconsistent with the majority holding he announced.
Id. at 318-19 (citation omitted). See generally Kamisar, supra note 21, at 607-11
(demonstrating the various ways in which the Court could frame constitutional issues and
the implications raised by each).
252 In the latter portion of his opinion, Justice Souter also rejected Atwater's
constitutional claim under a "balancing" analysis. Ultimately, Justice Souter held that "[i]f
an officer has probable cause to believe that an individual has committed even a very minor
criminal offense in his presence, he may, without violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest
the offender." 532 U.S. at 354.
253 My discussion of Atwater's use of history is not meant to duplicate Professor Davies'
critique of Atwater's historical analysis. Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,supra note 9.
Professor Davies' study is detailed, comprehensive and unmatched by any previous work on
the subject. My own discussion focuses on Atwater's use of history in comparison with the
Court's other precedents that consider the origins of the Fourth Amendment.
254 532 U.S. at 329. After recognizing that numerous common-law sources lend support
to Atwater's position, Justice Souter remarked that "Sir William Blackstone and Sir Edward
East might also be counted on Atwater's side, although they spoke only to the sufficiency of
breach of the peace as a condition to warrantless misdemeanor arrest, not to its necessity."
Id.at 329-30.
255 Id. at 330.
256 Id. (citing 2 HALE, supra note 37, at *84,*88 (1847)).
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He even mentioned that one common-law jurist upheld the warrantless arrest
of a "common cheater" discovered "cozen[ing] with false dice. 257 Justice
Souter concluded that there was "disagreement, not unanimity, among both the
common-law jurists and the text-writers who sought to pull the cases together
and summarize accepted practice"2 58 regarding the permissibility of a
warrantless arrest for a non-violent misdemeanor offense. Based on what he
understood as divergent views, Justice Souter was "not convinced that
Atwater's is the correct, or even necessarily the better, reading of the common25 9
law history."
Justice Souter also noted a "second, and equally serious, problem for
Atwater's historical argument .... "260 According to Justice Souter, "the legal
background of any conception of reasonableness the Fourth Amendment's
Framers might have entertained would have included English statutes, some
centuries old, authorizing peace officers (and even private persons) to make
warrantless arrests for all sorts of relatively minor offenses unaccompanied by
violence. 261 He then listed several British statutes "enacted by Parliament
well before this Republic's founding that authorized warrantless misdemeanor
arrests without reference to violence or turmoil. 262 These statutes included
laws authorizing the warrantless arrest of "nightwalkers," 263 persons who
participate in "unlawful game[s]," 2 64 "rogues, vagabonds, beggars, and other
idle and disorderly persons," 265 and "most significantly of all given the
circumstances of the case before us, negligent carriage drivers. 266 Justice
Souter emphasized that these "statutes riddle Atwater's supposed common-law
rule with enough exceptions to unsettle any contention that the law of the
mother country would have left the Fourth Amendment's Framers of a view
that it would necessarily have been unreasonable to arrest without warrant for a
267
misdemeanor unaccompanied by real or threatened violence.
Shifting from British common law to American Founding-era legal rules,
Justice Souter found additional evidence undermining Atwater's historical
argument. Significantly, Justice Souter pointed out that "Atwater has cited no
particular evidence that those who framed and ratified the Fourth Amendment
sought to limit peace officers' warrantless misdemeanor arrest authority to

257

532 U.S. at 331 (quoting Holyday v. Oxenbridge, 79 Eng. Rep. 805 (K.B. 1631)).

258

Id. at 332.

259

Id.

260

Id. at 333.

261

Id.

262 Id.
263 Id. at 334.
265

Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 335.

266

Id.

267

Id.

264
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instances of actual breach of the peace. '268 Furthermore, the Framers' actual
experience with non-violent misdemeanor arrests defeated Atwater's claim.
According to Justice Souter, "[d]uring the period leading up to and
surrounding the framing of the Bill of Rights, colonial and state legislatures,
like Parliament before them, . . . regularly authorized local peace officers to
make warrantless misdemeanor arrests without conditioning statutory authority
on breach of the peace. '269 These laws revealed that States had enacted laws
authorizing warrantless arrests for non-violent offenses, "and in so doing acted
very much inconsistently with Atwater's claims about the Fourth
Amendment's object. '270 According to Justice Souter, state practices were
relevant in determining the Framers' original intent for the Fourth Amendment.
Elaborating on this point, he asserted that:
A number of state constitutional search-and-seizure provisions served as
models for the Fourth Amendment, ... and the fact that many of the
original States with such constitutional limitations continued to grant their
own peace officers broad warrantless misdemeanor arrest authority
undermines Atwater's contention that the founding generation meant to
bar federal law enforcement officers from exercising the same
271
authority.
In sum, Justice Souter's analysis of British common law and American legal
rules regarding misdemeanor arrests at the time of the Framing convinced him
that there was no historical basis to believe that the Framers "'were at all
concerned about warrantless arrests by local constables and other peace
officers.' ' 272 Therefore, Justice Souter would not "conclude that the Fourth
Amendment, as originally understood, forbade peace officers to arrest without
a warrant for misdemeanors not amounting to or involving breach of the
273
peace."
Justice Souter's analysis of the Fourth Amendment's history in Atwater is
interesting from a number of angles. To begin with, although Justice Souter
has shown a willingness to grapple with constitutional history, 274 with the
268

Id. at 336.

269

Id. at 337.

Id. at 338.
339 (citations omitted).
272 Id. at 339-340 (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 429 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring)).
273 Id. at 340.
270

271 Id. at

274 See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 102-106 (1996) (Souter,
J., dissenting) (discussing the history of the states' sovereign immunity); Rosenberger v.
Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868-72 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(discussing the history of the First Amendment's Establishment Clause). In one particular
case, historical sources were crucial to Justice Souter's decision. See Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 971 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("In deciding these cases, which I
have found closer than I anticipated, it is The Federalist that finally determines my
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exception of Atwater, he has not been a proponent of the view that history
should play a significant role in modem Fourth Amendment doctrine. In
earlier cases when the Court divided over the role history should play in
current search and seizure disputes, Justice Souter was more likely to join a
dissent eschewing historical concerns 275 or a dissent which relied on history to
identify a broad norm embodied in the Amendment, rather than focus on
specific applications of common-law search and seizure rules. 2 76 In fact, when
the Court announced in Houghton that a historical inquiry is the starting point
for every Fourth Amendment case, Justice Souter joined Justice Stevens'
dissent which pointedly observed that the Court "ha[d] never restricted [itself]
to a two-step Fourth Amendment approach wherein the privacy and
governmental interests at stake must be considered only if 18th-century
common law 'yields no answer.' ' 277 Therefore, it was somewhat surprising
such a large portion of Justice Souter's opinion in Atwater focused on the
278
history of warrantless, non-violent misdemeanor arrests.
Besides the identity of its author, Atwater's historical analysis is significant
for reasons related to substantive Fourth Amendment concerns. For example,
Justice Souter's initial reason for rejecting Atwater's historical argument
focused on the lack of unanimity among common-law commentators and
279
jurists regarding an officer's warrantless misdemeanor arrest power.
According to Justice Souter, this disagreement among common-law sources
undermined the persuasiveness of Atwater's position. 280 To the extent that
precedent matters, however, unanimity among common-law sources regarding
the authority of a search or seizure privilege has never been an essential
cornerstone for a successful Fourth Amendment argument. To be sure, in
United States v. Watson, 281 the Court found unanimity among common-law
commentators and jurists regarding the validity of a warrantless felony
arrest. 28 2 But in Payton v. New York, 283 which addressed the constitutionality
position.").
275 See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 311 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting,
joined by Souter, J.); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 106-112 (1998) (Ginsburg, J.,

dissenting, joined by Souter, J.).
276 See Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. at 669-71 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting, joined by Souter, J.) Early in his tenure on the Court, Justice Souter joined
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), which

discussed common-law concepts of arrest and seizure.
277
278

Houghton, 526 U.S. at 311 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Perhaps Atwater's claim that history compelled a ruling in her favor prompted Justice

Souter's historical discussion. Counsel for Atwater, however, would have been foolish not
to discuss history in light of Houghton's command that history be the first consideration in

every Fourth Amendment case.
279

See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 328 (2001).

280

See supra notes 266-70 and accompanying text.

281423 U.S. 411 (1976).
282 Id. at 418.
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of a warrantless entry of a home to effect a routine felony arrest, the Court
repeatedly acknowledged the disagreement among common-law commentators
on the legality of a warrantless entry of a home to conduct an arrest. 284 As was
the case in Atwater, the Payton Court found "a surprising lack of judicial
decisions and a deep divergence among [common-law] scholars" on the
authority of a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest in the home. 285 The
Payton Court noted that "our study of the relevant common law does not
provide the same guidance that was present in Watson. ' 286 Although the
Payton majority interpreted the direction of the common-law sources as
"strongly suggest[ing] that the prevailing practice was not to make such arrests
except in hot pursuit or when authorized by a warrant,"2 87 that understanding
was neither necessary nor determinative of the matter. Instead, the Court
concluded that, "the issue is not one that can be said to have been definitively
settled by the common law at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted. '288
One year later in Steagald v. United States,289 the Court again found that
unanimity (or even support) among common-law commentators was not a
prerequisite to a successful Fourth Amendment claim. 290 At issue in Steagald
was whether an officer could search for the target of an arrest warrant in the
home of a third party without first obtaining a search warrant. 29 1 The
government argued that the common law authorized an officer to forcibly enter
a home of a third party to execute an arrest warrant. Steagald conceded that
"several commentators do suggest that a constable could 'break open doors' to
effect such an arrest. '292 Nonetheless, the Court explained that those common283 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
284 Id. at 592.
285 Id.; see also id. at

593 (recognizing that "[t]he common-law commentators disagreed

sharply on the subject," and that "three distinct views were expressed" on the validity of
warrantless entries to conduct felony arrests). Justice White, dissenting in Payton, did not
dispute the majority's description of the division among common-law sources. See id. at
606 ("[C]ommentators have differed as to the scope of the constable's inherent authority,
when not acting under a warrant, to break doors in order to arrest."). He did, however,
contend that the history of the Fourth Amendment did not support the rule announced by the
majority. Id.at 607-11 (arguing that the history of the Fourth Amendment indicates that the
Framers sought to alter rules allowing general warrants, and to preserve common-law arrest
rules).
286 Id. at 597.
287 Id. at 598.
288 Id.
289 451 U.S. 204 (1981).

290 See

id at 219-220 (discussing the divergent

commentators).
291 See id. at 207-08.
292 id. at 217 (citations omitted).

views held by common-law

William Cuddihy states that "[f]orcible entry [of

homes] to accomplish warrantless arrests had been part of the common law since at least
1333." Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 842 (citation omitted).
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law commentators had focused on arrests involving targets that had fled to a
third party's home. According to the Court, such "hot pursuit" cases were

distinguishable from the issue in Steagald, which involved the resident of a
home complaining about a warrantless search of his house. On this point, the
293
Steagald opinion asserted, the common law "sheds relatively little light.
Rather than focusing on what common-law sources said on the subject,
Steagald found that "the history of the Fourth Amendment strongly suggests
that its Framers would not have sanctioned the instant search." 294 That history
included the abuses associated with general warrants and writs of assistance.
According to Steagald, the constitutional evil of both general warrants and
writs of assistance was the lack of judicial control over the discretion of
officers in the field to search a particular home. 295 The arrest warrant in
'296
Steagald"suffer[ed] from the same infirmity.
As noted, most modem Fourth Amendment disputes do not have roots in the
common law. For the few cases that do, Payton and Steagald indicate that
litigants need not prove unanimity among common-law sources to prevail on
their constitutional claims. 297 Without acknowledging the change in direction
it represents, Atwater marks a departure from these cases. The reasoning
employed in Atwater signals that when a challenged police practice has roots
in the common law, disagreement among common-law sources-though not
necessarily fatal to a Fourth Amendment claim-certainly undermines the
strength of an argument that a challenged police practice is constitutionally
298
unreasonable.
293451 U.S. at 220.
294

Id.

295 See id.
296 According to the Court:

Like a writ of assistance, it specifies only the object of a search-in this case, [the
subject of the arrest warrant]-and leaves to the unfettered discretion of the police the
decision as to which particular homes should be searched. We do not believe that the
Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have condoned such a result.
Id.
297 Even when the "common-law pedigree of [a law enforcement rule] is pure on its
face," the Court has not felt constrained to adhere to a common-law rule where changes in
the legal and technological circumstances justify a different result. Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 15 (1985); see also id.
at 19-20 (rejecting the common-law rule that deadly force
can be used to prevent the escape of any fleeing felon, and holding that such force may only
be used where police have probable cause to believe that the fleeing felon poses a
significant threat of death or serious physical injury to others); cf County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1991) (rejecting, after minimal discussion, the claim
raised by Justice Scalia in dissent that the common law required a prompt judicial hearing to
determine whether a warrantless arrest was based on probable cause). Thus, the Burger
Court "occasionally consulted common law as a guide to reasonableness. But only as a very
rough guide." Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1764.
298 Although one could read Atwater as consistent with Steagald and Payton in that all
three cases discovered a lack of unanimity among common-law jurists and commentators on
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Although Justice Souter did not elaborate on the point, his reliance on the

divergence among common-law scholars and jurists raises the question why
unanimity, or even substantial agreement, among common-law sources matters

when judging the legitimacy of a Fourth Amendment privilege. Generally
speaking, disagreement among common-law scholars on the authority of a

the challenged police intrusion, there is a subtle difference between Steagald and Payton, on
the one hand, and Atwater, on the other. In Steagald and Payton, the lack of unanimity
regarding the specific police conduct under review was not as important as identifying a
general value or norm that motivated the Framers to adopt the Fourth Amendment. See
Steagald, 451 U.S. at 220 ("While the common law thus sheds relatively little light on the
narrow question before us, the history of the Fourth Amendment strongly suggests that its
Framers would not have sanctioned the instant search."); id. (arguing that the challenged
arrest warrant possessed the same trait that caused the Framers to oppose general warrants
and writs of assistance in that it "leaves to the unfettered discretion of the police the decision
as to which particular homes should be searched"). The Court in Payton found that:
It is obvious that the common-law rule on warrantless home arrests was not as clear as
the rule on arrests in public places ....The common-law sources display a sensitivity
to privacy interests that could not have been lost on the Framers. The zealous and
frequent repetition of the adage that a "man's house is his castle," made it abundantly
clear that both in England and in the colonies "the freedom of one's house" was one of
the most vital elements of English liberty.
Payton, 445 U.S. at 596-97 (citations omitted); see also id at 598 ("In all events, the issue is
not one that can be said to have been definitively settled by the common law at the time the
Fourth Amendment was adopted.").
In contrast, "[t]he historical discussion was an important component of' the Court's
decision-making in Atwater. Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism, supra note 9, at 273.
Justice Souter highlights the lack of unanimity as a significant defect in Atwater's historical
argument. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 327 (explaining that "[a]lthough [Atwater's] historical
argument is by no means insubstantial, it ultimately fails"); id. at 332 (pointing to
disagreement among common-law sources, and stating that "we simply are not convinced
that Atwater's is the correct, or even necessarily the better, reading of the common-law
history"); cf id. at 346 n.14 (explaining that a "heavy burden" is imposed on a party
challenging a police practice accepted when the Fourth Amendment was adopted). Justice
Souter's focus on the narrow question of whether the Framers intended the Amendment to
bar warrantless arrests for minor misdemeanors ignores the broader purpose and context
behind Framing era arrest doctrine. Professor Davies explains that:
[C]ommon law arrest doctrine was generally indisposed toward warrantless arrests
unless they serve a clear need. Because the common-law writers did not place much
faith in the judgment of ordinary officers, and because they generally rejected the idea
that "freemen" should be subject to any exercise of discretionary authority by ordinary
officers, there was a strong preference that a decision to arrest be made whenever
possible by a justice of the peace or other magistrate, rather than by an ordinary officer.
Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism, supra note 9, at 321. By narrowly focusing on
unanimity vel non regarding misdemeanor arrest power, Justice Souter thus misses
substantial historical evidence indicating "the largerpurpose for which the Framers adopted
the text; namely to curb the exercise of discretionary authority by officers." Davies,
Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 556 (emphasis added).
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particular legal norm should be expected. 299

Despite its conservative

reputation, "at various periods in its history the common law has shown a great
capacity for innovation, and some of the greatest common-law judges--Coke,
Hale, and Mansfield in Britain, and Shaw in this country-are famous for the
changes they brought about in the common law. ' 300 Further, if one accepts the
view that common-law norms do not derive from merely "a few exceptional
lawgivers (or one lawgiving generation), but [from] many generations of
lawyers and judges," 30 1 then divergence among common-law scholars on the
strength of a particular legal claim may not be especially significant, or even
relevant, when determining the meaning of the Constitution. Common-law
rules, like constitutional principles, do evolve with time.
More specifically, disagreement, or even unanimity, among common-law
scholars is a curious criterion for defining the scope of the Fourth Amendment.
"Many [Americans] who voted to adopt the Fourth Amendment may have read
Blackstone, and some of them had also read Coke. But there is little evidence
that most of them had mastered the common-law rules of search and seizure,
let alone endorsed them." 30 2 The Framers' constitutional concerns focused on

299

Cf Daniel A. Farber, DisarmedBy Time: The Second Amendment and the Failureof

Originalism,76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167, 172 (2000) [hereinafter Farber, DisarmedBy Time].
Professor Farber writes:
Historical interpretation is also made more difficult by the nature of democratic
decision making: For law to be made, a majority or super-majority must favor it, but
they need not agree among themselves about exactly what it means. Consequently, we
have no reason to assume that any consensus about the meaning of the provision
actually existed.
Id.
30 Strauss, supra note 15, at 888.
30 Id. at 905 (citation omitted).
302 Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1790; see also Amsterdam, supra note 2, at
467 n.464 (remarking on the absence from "pre-constitutional history [of] any affirmative
evidence that the framers intended to make law enforcement practices commonly used in
their time, or even such practices as had then been judicially approved, the measure of the
amendment"); cf H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understandingof OriginalIntent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 901-902 (1985) (suggesting that, although the Framers were intimately
familiar with the common law, the common law "did not yield ready responses to a number
of preliminary questions that required answers before constitutional interpretation could be
Of course, the Fourth
assimilated to the familiar patterns of legal construction").

Amendment is not the only provision in the Bill of Rights where Americans' thoughts on
the interplay between common-law norms and the Constitution were ambiguous. See, e.g.,
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 12-13 (1999) (questioning whether the
Framers, by creating the First Amendment, were simply restating Blackstone's view on free
speech, or whether they were "reacting against Blackstone, [by] establishing a distinctly

American version of freedom of speech that went beyond Blackstone and the English
common law"); cf STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASESCOMMENTS-QUESTIONS 645 (2001) ("[T]he historical record suggests that rather than
disclosing a coherent 'intent of the Framers,' those who influenced the framing of the
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searches and seizures directed at the home. No historical evidence has been
unearthed indicating that the Framers' constitutional thinking focused on

30 3
common-law search and seizure rules involving other topics.
Justice Souter's observation may also prove too much if it implies that
disagreement among British common-law sources generally undermines the

strength of constitutional arguments that the Framers would have considered a

challenged police practice constitutionally unreasonable. Ironically, during the
period preceding the Revolutionary era, British common-law commentators
were divided on the legality of the general warrant, the paradigm intrusion for
the Framers. 30 4 Similarly, the specific warrant the Fourth Amendment would
eventually endorse did not receive the unanimous approval of British search
and seizure theorists. Rather, British treatise writers advocated that the
specific warrant should only "displace the general warrant partially, in narrow
sectors of application, not categorically, across the spectrum of applications for
search and seizure. Moreover, they disagreed on the sectors in which general
warrants should yield to specific ones. ' 30 5 If common-law scholars were
[Religion Clauses of the First Amendment] were animated by several distinctive and
sometimes conflicting goals.").
303 Professor Cuddihy, in discussing the Framers' constitutional deliberation over
warrants, asserts the following:
In 1787-88, commentators on the Constitution denounced general warrants and
searches not just because they were general but because they abridged the security that
houses afforded from unwelcome intrusion. That houses were castles was the most
recurrent theme of those commentaries .... The concern with warrants, in short,
embraced a concern with houses, which encapsulated still deeper concerns. The
amendment's opposition to unreasonable intrusion, by warrant and without warrant,
sprang from a popular opposition to the surveillance and divulgement that intrusion
made possible. Open your front door, ran the argument, and the extent of federal
invasion will be infinite.
Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1545-47. Professor Cuddihy has also pointed out, however, that
"[I]ittle information exists on the Fourth Amendment's intent towards arrests without
warrant and towards the searches appropriate either to those arrests or to arrest warrants.
American legislation had ignored those topics before 1791, although it had discussed
searches both by search warrant and by authority of office." Id. at 1514.
31 See id. at 562-80.
305 Id. at 560. Conflicting views among common-law scholars were not confined to the
topic of general warrants. Scholars also disagreed on the process for issuing arrest warrants
and provided divergent interpretations on the concept of probable cause. For example,
Barbara Shapiro explains that Coke and Hale differed on "the question of whether the
justice of the peace must himself 'suspect' the accused in order to issue an arrest warrant."
BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE: HISTORICAL

134 (1991). Coke thought it
inappropriate for a justice of the peace to issue a warrant based on the suspicion of a private

PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE
party.

See SIR EDWARD COKE, THE FOURTH PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF

177 (W.S. Hein, 1986). Hale, on the
other hand, believed that a magistrate could issue an arrest warrant where a private party
swore that a felony had been committed and showed probable cause that a particular person
ENGLAND: CONCERNING THE JURISDICTION OF COURTS
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divided on the legality and application of general warrants, a subject
extensively discussed in America and one that generated broad consensus
among the Framers, why should their opinions be relevant on issues that did
not influence or occupy the Framers' constitutional thinking? Disagreement
(or even unanimity) among common-law sources on the legality, for example,
of a warrantless, non-violent misdemeanor arrest, or on the scope of a search
incident to arrest, tells us very little about the constitutionality of these
intrusions. These were not topics that motivated the Framers to adopt the
30 6
Fourth Amendment.
committed the offense. See 1 HALE, supra note 37, *579-80 ("Therefore I think, that if A.
makes oath before a justice of peace of a felony committed in fact, and that he suspects B.
and shews probable cause of suspicion the justice may grant his warrant to apprehend
B .... "). Professor Davies contends that the differences between Coke and Hale on this
point were inconsequential to the Framers because "Hale's position had clearly won out by
the eighteenth century, and Coke's was mentioned only as a point of historical interest."
Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,supra note 9, at 282 n. 125. Regarding the concept of
probable cause, Coke thought that a "bare surmise" was not enough of a foundation for a
warrant to issue. See COKE, supra at 177 ("One or more justice or justices of peace cannot
make a warrant upon a bare surmise to break any man's house to search for a felon, or for
stolen goods .... ). Hale, in contrast, provided a more precise measure of when a warrant
could be issued. As Shapiro points out:
[Tihe well-developed concept of suspicion, which appears in so many contexts, is thus
joined to a standard of probable cause, which is to assist in determining how much
suspicion is necessary. We thus have [in Hale's formulation] an attempt to become
more precise than Coke's rejection of "bare surmise."
SHAPIRO, supra at 146.
306 As the concept of a search incident to arrest illustrates, the Framers' thoughts on
intrusions that shared characteristics of a general warrant search remain ambiguous even
when considered in light of the writings of common-law scholars and jurists. See Cloud,
supra note 62, at 1746 n. 135 (noting that "history is ambiguous" on the permissible scope of
searches incident to arrest). On the one hand, some suggest that the common law permitted
searches incident to arrest. See, e.g., LANDYNSKI, supra note 14, at 98 ("[T]he right to
search as an incident of arrest is deeply rooted in the common law and is conceded .... );
TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 28 (1969) ("There is
little reason to doubt that search of an arrestee's person and premises is as old as the
institution of arrest itself."). On the other hand, at the time of the Revolution, legal
authorities did not recognize an officer's power to search an arrestee's home incident to
arrest. As Professor Cuddihy points out:
The legal authors of 1761-1776 agreed that houses could be broken into to consummate
the arrest process, but they did not also say that houses could be searched during that
process. The assumption of most legal authorities, in other words, was that arrests and
arrest warrants were not excuses to conduct general searches.
Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1183-84. By the time the Fourth Amendment was ratified, legal
treatises did not provide clear answers on the permissible scope of a search incident to an
arrest that occurred inside a home. See id. at 1552. Thus, according to one historian of the
Amendment, "[t]he men who ratified the Fourth Amendment assumed some ambit of
search-incident-to-arrest, but they neglected to announce its [constitutional] perimeter." Id.
(citation omitted).
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Justice Souter's assertion that "[a] second, and equally serious ' 3 07 defect
undermined Atwater's historical argument is problematic for several reasons.
First, he provides no support for his claim that the Framer's conception of
constitutional "reasonableness" would have included search and seizure norms
that British statutes recognized. 30 8 In fact, there is good reason to believe that
the Framers never intended "reasonableness" to serve as the standard for
judging search and seizure norms. "For one thing, the historical sources show
that framing-era law did not recognize any 'reasonableness' standard for
arrests and searches." 309 Professor Davies' thorough study of the history of
the Amendment shows that "reasonableness was not used as a standard for
assessing searches or arrests in framing-era legal sources, and there is also no
persuasive evidence of the use of any such standard during the framing of the
state or federal constitutional provisions. '3 10 According to Davies, history
provides no support for the contention that the Framers either contemplated
that various types of warrantless searches and seizures would be judged by a
reasonableness standard, or employed "a sweeping reasonableness-in-thecircumstances standard in the pre-framing- or framing-era sources. '3 11 The
Framers focused on searches and seizures occurring in the home pursuant to
general warrants. Thus, if Davies' interpretation is correct, the premise of
Justice Souter's assertion-that the Framers maintained a constitutional
conception of "reasonableness" that characterized specific searches and
seizures-describes a constitutional paradigm unknown to the Framers.
Even assuming that the Framers did envision searches and seizures being
assessed under a "reasonableness" standard, Justice Souter's bald assertionthat the Framers' conception of constitutional reasonableness included the
types of searches and arrests permitted by British law-is simply not selfevident. In fact, Justice Souter's assumption that the Framers incorporated the
various search and seizure norms of British statutory law as part of their
comprehension of reasonableness is inconsistent with key episodes of the
Fourth Amendment's history. To be sure, early Americans viewed themselves
as asserting the "rights" of Englishmen. 312 As illustrated above, however, the
307 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 333 (2001).
308
309

See supra notes 272-77 and accompanying text.
Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 591.

310 Id; see also Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,supra note 9, at 320 (noting that
historical sources concerning the Framers' attitudes toward criminal procedure "do not

contain any endorsements of the relativistic reasonableness-in-the-circumstances notion that
is prominent in recent search and seizure doctrine" (citation omitted)).
311 Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 600; see also
Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,supra note 9, at 398-99 (contending that rather than
revealing that the Framers meant to endorse the adoption of a reasonableness standard, "the

authentic history is that the Framers meant for the Fourth Amendment to reinforce the
common-law principle that discretionary arrest or search authority should not be conferred
on ordinary peace officers").
312 See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
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Fourth Amendment was a reaction to the colonists' experience with heavyhanded and arbitrary British search and seizure practices, many of which were
authorized by British statutory law. The history of the Fourth Amendment thus
provides poor support for the conclusion that the Framers intended to adopt
British search and seizure laws as the touchstone for constitutional
reasonableness. Rather than admiring British rules, "the colonists rebelled
against English search and seizure practices. '313 Although the complete
history of the Amendment cannot be canvassed here, even the following
cursory review of significant moments in that history reveals that the Fourth
Amendment was a direct response to searches and seizures authorized by
British statutory law or royal prerogative.
"Discretionary search[es] authorized by parliamentary statute date[] from at
least 1355, when 'good men' were commanded to search for counterfeit
bullion. ' '314 By the seventeenth century, political and religious censorship was
widespread in England, and government agents were authorized to search
homes and offices to discover dissentient writings. "Numerous statutes,
decrees, and ordinances invited searchers to seize any publication considered
'seditious, schismatical ... scandalous.., popish... puritanical ... contrary
to the doctrine and discipline of the Church of England, .. . against the
state ... malignant ... [or] offensive.' ' 315 Around the end of the 1660's,
"[f]aws relating to guilds, hearth money, censorship, insurrection, and the
excise all permitted discretionary, warrantless searches in houses of broad
categories of the citizenry. '316 English search and seizure laws became even
more oppressive in the eighteenth century. As related by two historians:
The strongest examples of discretionary legislation occurred not in the
[sixteenth and seventeenth centuries], however, but in the eighteenth
century, which brought a three-fold enlargement in the use of the general
search. First, the vulnerability of Englishmen's houses to the excise grew
enormously. In the seventeenth century, chiefly the houses of persons
vocationally connected with intoxicating beverages were subject to
unwelcome, warrantless inspection by the exciseman. As the eighteenth
century advanced, however, so did the number and range of excised
commodities, until such diverse articles as salt, soap, paper, and glass

THE CONSTITUTION

293 (1997) ("Though Americans invoked broader claims of natural

rights as the impasse with Britain verged toward civil war, their dispute was always about
their English rights."); cf DAVID HACKETT FISCHER, PAUL REVERE'S RIDE 256 (1994)
(noting that the last words of a Massachusetts colonist who chose to defend his home
against advancing British troops after friends urged him to flee were, "'An Englishman's
home is his castle').
313 Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of

Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM. 465, 478 (1984) (citation omitted).
314 Cuddihy & Hardy, supranote 173, at 373 (citation omitted).
311 Id. (alteration and omissions in original) (citation omitted).
316 Id. at 379 (citation omitted).
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were included. When an item became taxable under the excise, the
houses of everyone whose occupation was concerned with it became
subject to search. Consequently, the proportion of the population so
3 17
affected grew apace.
In America, British search and seizure laws were a major irritant to the
colonists. In particular, British customs officers used writs of assistance to
invade the homes of colonists. "Writs of assistance were legalized by a series
of acts of Parliament giving customs officers authority to search for and seize
uncustomed goods." 3 18 Like general warrants, writs of assistance facilitated
searches without a cause or suspicion of wrongdoing. 3 19 The writ was "more
dangerous" than a general warrant because it was not required to be returned to
a judge after a search, "but was good as a continuous license and authority
during the whole lifetime of the reigning sovereign. The discretion delegated
to the official was therefore practically absolute and unlimited. '320 In
Massachusetts Bay Colony, local merchants and their supporters violently
contested the search practices of customs officers, and use of the writs ignited
a political firestorm in Massachusetts. After George II died on October 25,
1760, James Otis, Jr. represented a group who opposed the writs and sued to
prevent the granting of new writs. Although opponents of the writs lost in
court, John Adams later described Otis's denunciation of the writs and English
search and seizure policies as "the first scene of opposition to the arbitrary
32
claims of Great Britain." '
Opposition to English search and seizure laws was not confined to
Massachusetts. The Massachusetts writs of assistance case was resolved in

Id. at 382 (citation omitted).
0. M. Dickerson, Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the Revolution, in THE ERA OF
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 40,43 (Richard B. Morris ed., 1939).
319 English law authorized the issuance of writs of assistance, but the writs themselves
did not authorize any power to search. The writ was not a search warrant, but was instead
"a sort of identity card by which the customs officer could establish himself as a man to be
heeded." Smith, supra note 184, at 39. The power of entry and search allowed under the
English 1662 Act of Frauds was "condition[ed] upon the presence of a constable or other
local public officer. The writ of assistance merely ordered the constable to assist the
customs officer in his search-a search that rested on [the] statutory authority [of the 1662
Act of Frauds]." Bruce Mann, The Writs of Assistance Case, 11 CONN. L. REv. 353, 356
317
318

(1979).
320 LASSON,
321

supra note 223, at 54.

Id. at 59. According to John Adams, in making his speech:

Otis was a flame of fire! ... American independence was then and there born; the

seeds of patriots and heroes were then and there sown, to defend the vigorous
youth,.. . Every man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready

to take arms against writs of assistance. Then and there was the first scene of the first
act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child
Independence was born.
10 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 247-48 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1856).
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1761, but another English statute, the Townshend Revenue Act of 1769,
generated legal controversy and violence in other colonies over British search
and seizure policies. Under the Townshend Act, "writs of assistance became
an issue throughout the colonies, involving every judge and prominent lawyer
in America outside of Massachusetts and New Hampshire. '322 The British
designed the Townshend Act to eliminate lingering questions over the legality
of writs of assistance in America by authorizing the highest court in each
colony to issue writs of assistance to British customs officers. The Act
authorized general writs, which allowed customs officers to search without
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. When customs officers sought new
writs under the Townshend Act, a new round of legal battles erupted between
British officials and colonial judges who refused to issue general writs.
Despite "formidable pressure" from high-ranking British officials, the colonial
"judiciary from Connecticut to Florida, with one exception, stood firm in
opposing the legality of the particular form of writ demanded of them and
continued in their judicial obstinacy through six years of nearly constant efforts
'32 3
to force them to yield.
The nexus between the Townshend Act and the Fourth Amendment is easy
to discern. As Professor Davies notes:
[T]he memory of Parliament's 1767 reauthorization of general warrants
for customs searches of houses was the principal stimulus for the
adoption of bans against general warrants in the state declarations of
rights adopted between 1776 and 1784, and for the anti-Federalist calls
for a federal ban against general warrants during the constitutional
ratification debates of 1787-88.324
Indeed, the actions of colonial judges in the Townshend controversy "signified
the beginnings of a dialogue on the writs and of a consensus against general
warrants by the American judiciary. 3 25 Resistance to the Townshend writs
"was something more than a local question and with such a widespread legal
discussion it is hardly to be wondered if a fourth amendment was proposed for
326
the American Constitution."
Obviously, history does not establish that the Framers believed warrantless
arrests for non-violent misdemeanor offenses were unconstitutional. As
already noted, the Framers' specific view of the constitutionality of such
arrests is unknown because these seizures were not on the constitutional
322

Dickerson, supra note 318, at 48; see also Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1044-84

(describing the colonial response to the Townshend writs); Joseph Frese, Writs of
Assistance in the American Colonies 231-50 (1951) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,

Harvard University) (on file with author) (illustrating the effect of the Townshend writs on
the colonial population).
323 Dickerson, supra note 318, at 74.
324 Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 567 n.29.
325 Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1097.
326 Frese, supra note 322, at 300.

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 82:895

agenda of the Framers. 327 This history, however, does reveal that Americans
often opposed, not approved, British search and seizure practices, which casts
doubt on Justice Souter's assumption that the Framers considered ordinary
English search and seizure law as the equivalent of constitutional
reasonableness. In the courts and on the streets, Americans fought the
application of many British search and seizure laws, particularly when those
laws subjected their homes to unjustified and arbitrary search. As a
constitutional matter, however, the general warrants and writs of assistance
that authorized indiscriminate searches of homes preoccupied the Framers'
thoughts on the Fourth Amendment. 328 Justice Souter does not point to any
evidence that suggests that the Framers' constitutional thinking focused on, let
alone endorsed, English statutes on other search and seizure topics.
327

329

Cf Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism, supra note 9, at 339 n.310. In Professor

Davies' words:
The absence of recorded expressions of concern by [the] Framers regarding arrest
authority is an example of evidence of the dog-that-did-not-bark-in-the-night varietya silence attributable to familiarity. The common-law legal sources that the Framers
consulted described arrest law as an essentially settled subject from Coke' time to their
own. Thus, the Framers did not say much about arrest authority for the simple reason
that they did not perceive arrest authority was or might become problematic.
Id.
328 See Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 601.
According to Davies:
[T]he actual complaints and concerns about search and seizure expressed during the
historical controversies that preceded the Revolution were focused on searches of
houses under general warrants. Except for the vicarious concerns over the use of
general warrants for arrests in connection with the English Wilkesite cases, which
involved both arrests and searches of houses and papers, the prerevolutionary
controversies were devoid of any consideration of arrest authority.
Id. Further, Davies points out that:
[Tihe complaints expressed during the prerevolutionary controversies and during the
ratification debates reveal that the Framers simply did not harbor diffuse fears
regarding search and seizure authority. Rather, they were concerned specifically with
the threat posed by general warrants, especially in the context of revenue searches of
houses.
Id. at 610-611.
320 Cf Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism, supra note 9, at 331-32. Professor Davies
disputes Atwater's conclusion that Framing-era English statutes reflected the Framers'
understanding of constitutional doctrine, contending that "[n]one of these statutes actually
were in effect in the American colonies, unless they had been reenacted by the colonial or
state legislatures, Although Americans had access to them, there is no reason to assume
they conformed to American constitutional understandings unless they were actually
copied." Id. (footnotes omitted). Professor Davies also points out that Atwater's discussion
of the relevance of pre-Framing British statutes "conflated two very different sorts of
English 'statutes."' Id at 327 (citation omitted). The first category of statutes, according to
Davies, consisted of British statutes that were several centuries old, like the 1285 Statute of
Winchester, 13 Edw. 1, ch.4 (1285), and that were routinely discussed and included in
common-law treatises familiar to the Framers. These ancient statutes authorized detentions
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In shifting the focus of his historical analysis from British common law to
American Founding-era legal rules, Justice Souter noted that Atwater had not
cited any "particular evidence that those who framed and ratified the Fourth
Amendment sought to limit peace officers' warrantless misdemeanor arrest
authority to instances of actual breach of the peace, and [the Court's] own
review of the recent and respected compilations of framing-era documentary
history has likewise failed to reveal any such design. '330 Justice Souter
additionally noted that the "actual practice" experienced by the Framers
undermined Atwater's historical claim. 331 He pointed out that "[d]uring the
period leading up to and surrounding the framing of the Bill of Rights, colonial
and state legislatures, like Parliament before them, regularly authorized local
peace officers to make warrantless misdemeanor arrests without conditioning
statutory authority on breach of the peace. ' 33 2 According to Justice Souter,
this historical information is significant because it reveals that the same states
that had those constitutional provisions which would later serve as models for
the Fourth Amendment "continued to grant their own peace officers broad
warrantless misdemeanor arrest authority. '333 Thus, according to Justice
Souter, the Fourth Amendment, "as originally understood," could not be read
to support Atwater's claim that a warrantless arrest for a non-violent
334
misdemeanor was constitutionally unreasonable.
Justice Souter's observations here suggest an answer to a critical inquiry
raised earlier about how the Court should use history to decide Fourth
Amendment disputes. As mentioned above, the Court's prior cases had not yet
resolved the important threshold matter of whether historical sources are
relevant only when common-law rules or the Framers' "original

for individuals found nightwalking and for strangers found lodging in a town. Davies
concludes that:
[T]hese ancient or well-settled statutory provisions show that the general common-law
rules regarding arrest authority were subject to specific exceptions to deal with
situations that evidenced an unusual need for warrantless arrest authority. But that is
all they show. They did not create warrantless arrest authority for genuinely minor
offenses-and certainly not "for all sorts of relatively minor offenses," [as claimed in
Atwater].
Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,supra note 9, at 330-31 (citation omitted). In Davies'
view, it is safe to "assume that [these ancient statutes] were part of the Framers'
understanding of 'the law of the land' and 'due process of law."' Id.
The second category of British statutes is of more recent vintage. These statutes
authorized arrests for gambling, drunkenness, vagrancy, swearing and other minor offenses.
Davies contends that this group of British laws "were [not] part of the Framers'
understanding of constitutional criminal procedure." Id. at 331.
330 Atwater, 532 U.S. at 336 (citations omitted).
' Id. at 337.
332 Id. (citations omitted).
333 Id. at 339.
331 Id at 340.
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understanding" directly address the precise issue confronting the Court, or are
instead to be consulted by the Justices to gauge "the general thrust of the
Amendment, not its detailed applications. ' 335 Justice Souter's comments about
the lack of "particular evidence" indicating that the Framers sought to limit the
misdemeanor arrest authority of peace officers, 336 and his focus on the "actual
practice" experienced by early Americans regarding misdemeanor arrest
power, 337 indicate that history matters only when evidence of the Framers'
intent directly addresses the specific issue before the Court. By employing
history in this way, Justice Souter and the Atwater majority made an important
statement that may influence future Fourth Amendment cases.
To the extent that history matters in future Fourth Amendment cases, a
litigant may have to provide specific evidence that the Framers sought to limit
the precise conduct under challenge, or that colonial and state legislatures
enacted measures forbidding the specific police search or seizure under review.
This is an extremely heavy evidentiary burden, one that many past Fourth
Amendment litigants have been unable to satisfy. For example, the defendant
in Katz v. United States338 would not have been able to cite "particular
evidence" that those who framed and ratified the Fourth Amendment sought to
339
limit the authority of governmental officials to conduct covert surveillance.
Similarly, past defendants challenging the scope of a search incident to arrest
would not have been able to cite "particular evidence" that the Framers
expressed a view on the legality of such searches, or show that colonial or state
340
legislatures enacted laws designed to limit such searches.
31Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1764.
336

532 U.S. at 337-40.

337 Id. at

337-38.

338 389 U.S. 347 (1967).

339The use of covert surveillance has deep historical roots. See Tracey Maclin,
Informants and the Fourth Amendment, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 573, 622 (1996) (citing preFraming era examples of government use of secret informants); see also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 366 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting) ("There can be no doubt that the
Framers were aware of [eavesdropping], and if they had desired to outlaw or restrict the use
of evidence obtained by eavesdropping, I believe that they would have used the appropriate
language to do so in the Fourth Amendment."); Geoffrey Stone, The Scope of the Fourth
Amendment: Privacy and the Police Use of Spies, Secret Agents, and Informers, 1976 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 1193, 1235 (asserting the plausibility of arguing that the use of secret
agents "cannot reasonably be brought within the amendment's coverage because the
framers, although aware of the use of secret agents and spies, did not affirmatively intend to
bring the practice within the scope of the constitutional prohibition," though ultimately
concluding that such an argument is unpersuasive).
340 See supra note 306 and accompanying text (discussing the ambiguity of Framing era
law on the permissible scope of a search incident to arrest); cf United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 230 (1973) (conceding that some common-law commentators were "simply
silent" on the authority of an officer's search incident to arrest); Davies, Recovering the
OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 638 n.250 (asserting that "[r]eported decisions

2002]

LET SLEEPING DOGS LIE: FOURTHAMENDMENT HISTORY 965

Concededly, history did not influence the Court when it decided Katz and
the search-incident-to-arrest cases. 341 But even in those Fourth Amendment
contexts in which members of the Rehnquist Court have been willing to rely on
history, only in one case, Wilson, has a litigant been able to present the type of
historical evidence necessary to satisfy the burden Justice Souter announced in
Atwater.342 Indeed, although Justice Souter voted to sustain their constitutional
claims, the litigants in Acton, Carter and Houghton were unable to cite the type
of "particular evidence" the Atwater Court demanded. One consequence of
Atwater's preference for historical sources that provide particular evidence of
the Framers' thinking on a specific issue may be that fewer Supreme Court
litigants will have an incentive to rely on the rich history of the Fourth
Amendment when constructing their constitutional arguments.
Justice Souter's decision to favor historical sources that speak to specific
applications of search and seizure claims will affect more than the content of
future arguments presented by Fourth Amendment litigants. If this approach to
history remains the norm for future search and seizure disputes, the beneficial
purposes of a historical inquiry will be lost. Few jurists or legal scholars
would disagree with the general proposition that the Framers' intention is the
proper starting point for constitutional interpretation. 343 Therefore, Justice
Souter correctly inquired about the Framers' intentions regarding the Fourth
Amendment. But his demand that Atwater provide particular evidence that the
Framers sought to limit an officer's authority to conduct a warrantless, nonviolent misdemeanor arrest misconceives the main reason that the history of
the Fourth Amendment is relevant to current search and seizure disputes. The
flaw in Justice Souter's historical analysis is that it fails to distinguish between
"the use of background history to establish that the framers of the Bill of
Rights meant to limit or forbid a particular evil, and the use of background

regarding the allowable scope of searches incident to arrest first became evident in court
records during the late nineteenth century").
341 Cf Sklansky, Common Law, supra note 1, at 1741 ("[B]y the early 1970s the history
of the Fourth Amendment seemed increasingly beside the point.").
342 See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (stating that "[a]n examination of
the common law of search and seizure leaves no doubt that the reasonableness of a search of
a dwelling may depend in part on whether law enforcement officers announced their
presence and authority prior to entering"); id. at 934 ("Given the longstanding common-law
endorsement of the practice of announcement, we have little doubt that the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment thought that the method of an officer's entry into a dwelling was among
the factors to be considered in assessing the reasonableness of a search or seizure.").
133 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 13, § 1-14 at 48. As Professor Tribe suggests:
Regardless of how committed one might be to the notion of the Constitution as fluid
and evolving, it seems clear that interpretation of its provisions-or, indeed, of its
design-must at least begin with the question of what those provisions, or that design,
meant at the time they were conceived and, later, at the time they became law.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Strauss, supra note 15, at 881 ("Virtually everyone agrees
that the specific intentions of the Framers count for something." (citation omitted)).
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history to support the negative inference that they did not." 344
Professor Laurence Tribe recently noted that when interpreting the
Constitution, judges and scholars should be careful to differentiate original
meaning from original expectation. 345 He argues that those who interpret the
Constitution often fail to distinguish between,
[W]hat something in the Constitution meant at the time of its adoption
and what various people connected with that adoption-authors, ratifiers,
kibitzers-imagined or assumed its adoption would do, in terms of the
concrete and specific practices or policies it would be likely to require, or
346
permit, or forbid.
The example of racially segregated public schools nicely illustrates
Professor Tribe's point. The fact that those who wrote and ratified the
Fourteenth Amendment expected that racial segregation of public school
children would survive a constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause does not foreclose the possibility that racial segregation might
subsequently be considered to be inconsistent with the meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause. 347 In other words, when "dealing with a text designed to do
the sorts of things our Constitution does, the case is compelling for treating
'34
linguistic intentions as relevant, and legal intentions as largely irrelevant. 1
Professor Tribe's waming about distinguishing original meaning from
original expectation is especially pertinent to the Fourth Amendment. The
history of the Amendment does not justify "limiting its reach to the particular
'mischief which gave it birth."' 349 As Professor Amsterdam has noted:
Indisputably the "searches and seizures" on the agenda at the time the
fourth amendment was written were the rummagings of the English
messengers and colonial customs officers. We can reconstruct with some
fair confidence what "the framers" thought of those. It is illusory to
suppose that we can know what they thought of anything else. Nothing
350
else was then in controversy.
When these insights are applied to Atwater, the flaw in Justice Souter's
historical analysis becomes readily apparent. We know from the text and

344Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 397-98.
345See TRIBE, supra note 13, § 1-14 at 53-56 (supporting Ronald Dworkin's distinction

between the collective intent and the individual expectations of lawgivers).
346

Id. at 54.

347Id. at 54-55; see Farber, DisarmedBy Time, supra note 299, at 178 ("Focusing solely
on the concrete applications anticipated by the framers makes it difficult or impossible to
justify decisions, such as the school desegregation cases, that by common agreement were
correct in their outcomes." (citation omitted)).
348TRIBE, supra note 13, § 1-14 at 54 (citation omitted).
349Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 397 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373
(1910)).
350 Id. at 398,
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background history of the Fourth Amendment that the Framers meant to forbid
a specific practice: the issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance. By
targeting this particular mischief, the Framers sought to promote broader goals
related to privacy, property, and freedom from unjustified and arbitrary
governmental intrusion. 351 It is plausible to suppose, after studying commonlaw sources and early American statutes, that many people in the Founding
generation-Framers, Ratifiers and ordinary citizens--expected constables to
retain the authority to affect a warrantless arrest for a non-violent misdemeanor
in limited circumstances, notwithstanding the adoption of the Fourth
Amendment. 352 But it is delusory to conclude from these materials that the
Framers meant to place an officer's power to affect such arrests outside of the
reach of the Amendment. We do not know the Framers' constitutional
intentions regarding warrantless misdemeanor arrests, just as we do not know
their constitutional intentions regarding the use of covert surveillance. These
police practices did not spawn political or legal controversy during the
Framing-era.
Put simply, the constitutional validity of warrantless
misdemeanor arrests was not on the Framers' radar screen.
Justice Souter's emphasis on the relevance of state search and seizure
practice when "unearthing the Amendment's original meaning" 353 is yet
351See Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1547-48 ("Privacy was the bedrock concern of the
amendment, not general warrants."). Consider also the following statement by Professor
Cloud:
Their decision to identify in the text only the most notorious example of unreasonable
searches and seizures in the colonial experience does not mean that the Framers were
unconcerned about other methods that shared noxious characteristics with general
warrants. Instead, the historical record suggests that objections to general warrants and
general searches alike rested upon broad concerns about protecting privacy, property,
and liberty from unwarranted and unlimited intrusions.
Cloud, supra note 62, at 1726 (citations omitted); cf Davies, Recovering the Original
Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 736 (asserting that the Framers "banned general
warrants in order to prevent the officer from exercising discretionary authority").
352 The above text assumes that Justice Souter's analysis of Framing-era misdemeanor
arrest power is accurate. Justice Souter's historical analysis, however, has been forcibly
(and persuasively) challenged. See, e.g., Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,supra note 9,
at 354. Professor Davies notes that the colonial and state statutes cited in Atwater
do not show that the Framers would have been willing to accept broad warrantless
arrest authority for petty offenses. They certainly do not show that the Framers would
have accepted the constitutionality of legislative grants of across-the-boardwarrantless
arrest authority for any and all misdemeanors. Indeed, the most significant feature of
these statutes is what none of them did: none of them were comparable to modern state
statutes-like the Texas statute in Atwater-that confer across-the-board arrest
authority regarding any and all offenses of any level of seriousness ....Rather, the
arrest provisions in these statutes show only that warrantless arrest authority was
sometimes extended to specific misdemeanors when there seemed to be an unusual
need for immediate arrest.
Id.
353Atwater, 532 U.S. at 339.
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another instance in which his historical analysis fails to distinguish between
what the Framing generation meant when the Fourth Amendment was adopted
and what the expectations of other legal actors regarding the permissibility of
different search and seizure practices were at the time. Standing alone, Justice
Souter's comment that state search and seizure practices are not "irrelevant in
unearthing the Amendment's original meaning" 354 is unobjectionable. It is an
entirely different matter, however, to consider state practices as a constitutional
baseline when determining the Fourth Amendment's original meaning,
particularly when the issue concerns a topic not on the Framers' constitutional
agenda.
For example, it is fair to assume that few members of the founding
generation imagined or expected that the adoption of the Fourth Amendment
would affect the power of a peace officer to employ deadly force to stop a
fleeing felon. As the Court recognized in Garner, the common law and early
American practice "imposed a flat prohibition against the use of deadly force
to stop a fleeing misdemeanant, coupled with a general privilege to use such
force to stop a fleeing felon. '355 The prevailing practices of the states
regarding the use of deadly force, however, tell us very little about the
Framers' thoughts on this topic because the use of deadly force was not
controversial in 1791.
Likewise, the fact that the states routinely authorized broad warrantless
misdemeanor arrest powers in the Framing-era offers scant insight on the
original meaning of the Fourth Amendment. In early America, constitutional
"rights" were routinely subject to the regulatory power of the state. Even the
"fundamental trinity of inalienable rights" 356-life, liberty, and property-were
the objects of state legislation. 357 It is plausible to assume that in the late
eighteenth century, few, if any, Americans would have expected or assumed
that the Fourth Amendment prohibited warrantless arrests for non-violent
misdemeanors, just as few imagined the Amendment barred a peace officer
from using deadly force to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon. It is likely that
the expectation of most Americans was that the "right" against unreasonable
search and seizure protected them from general search and arrest warrants.
Beyond this specific privilege, the scope and meaning of the Fourth
358
Amendment was just beginning to develop.
Justice Souter, however, apparently believes that the practice of states in the

Id.
Tennesee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (citations omitted).
356 RAKOVE, supra note 312, at 290.
357 See id. at 291 ("Nearly all the activities that constituted the realms of life, liberty,
354
151

property, and religion were subject to regulation by the state; no obvious landmarks marked
the boundaries beyond which its authority could not intrude, if its actions met requirements
of law." (citation omitted)).
358 See Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1548-54 (describing the areas of uncertain meaning in
the Fourth Amendment after 1791).
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Framing-era reveals the Framers' intent concerning the Fourth Amendment.
Noting that state laws permitting broad misdemeanor arrest powers co-existed
with state constitutional search and seizure provisions, he infers that the
Framers of the federal constitution, because they adopted a provision which
mirrored the states' search-and-seizure provisions, did not intend to bar federal
law enforcement officers from exercising the same misdemeanor arrest powers
given to state officers. The fundamental problem with Justice Souter's
inference is that he is deciding a question that the Framers never considered.
As with the issue of officers using deadly force, the authority of peace officers
to effect warrantless misdemeanor arrests was not controversial or of great
consequence in 1791. Whether the "original" Fourth Amendment would have
anything to say about warrantless misdemeanor arrests is purely speculative.
Just as the Framers had not sorted out their own beliefs on the scope of
freedom of the press when they adopted the Free Press Clause of the First
Amendment "because no issue forced them to do SO,' 3 59 they also had not
addressed the constitutionality of warrantless arrests for non-violent
misdemeanors because no cause or case had yet required that they do so.
Furthermore, the fact that the states routinely authorized officers to make
warrantless arrests for non-violent misdemeanors does not prove that the
Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to permit equivalent arrest powers
for federal officers. That which preceded the Fourth Amendment is not
necessarily definitive of it; searches and seizures acceptable under the common
law may well have been anachronistic in 1791.360 Though the text of the
Fourth Amendment does mirror sections of the states' constitutional provisions
on search and seizure, 361 Justice Souter provides no evidence (historical or
otherwise) to support his supposition that the Framers intended to establish
state search and seizure practice as a baseline for the Fourth Amendment's
original meaning.
Indeed, at least some of the Framers might be surprised to learn that state

359 LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF THE

PRESS IN AMERICA 50

(1991). Professor Powe explains that:

The First Amendment was not intended to answer th[e] question [of the scope of
freedom of the press], because that question was left entirely to the states.
Nevertheless, because this wrong question has dominated the legal history of the First
Amendment, it is worth attempting to answer it; but we must recognize that there will
necessarily be ambiguities in answering a question that the framers never asked.

Id. at 48-49.
360 See Cuddihy, supra note 37, at 1552 n.393; Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism,
supra note 9, at 344 (noting that some of the early colonial statutes cited in Atwater were
antiquated by the Framing-era).
361 See Davies, Recovering the OriginalFourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 693 ("The
historical record of the framing of the Fourth Amendment shows that it was essentially a
replay of the framing of the state provisions."); see also id. at 696 (explaining that when
drafting the Fourth Amendment, James Madison "borrowed from a number of previous
provisions to fashion a novel proposal").
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search and seizure practice is now being used to determine the Fourth
Amendment's scope. James Madison's skepticism of the efficacy of the states'
declaration of rights was well known:
Madison saw little evidence that the state declarations of rights had any
efficacy in securing their avowed objects. Not only had they failed to
restrain the state assemblies, they had done nothing to brake the factious
passions swirling among the people at large. Bills of rights were as much
"parchment barriers" as the formal affirmations of the principle of
separation of powers had been found to be-and not coincidentally, since
these cautions against the concentration of powers commonly appeared in
the declaration of rights rather than in the main texts of the state
362
constitutions.
This skepticism, combined with Madison's concern that "the problem of rights
was no longer to protect the people as a collective whole from government but
to defend minorities and individuals against popular majorities acting through
government, '363 suggests that state search and seizure practices might be a
poor source for discovering the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The fact that the Framers were concerned with, and focused on, questions
surrounding general search and arrest warrants thus reveals why the Fourth
Amendment specifically prohibits the issuance of general warrants. In this
way, the Fourth Amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, "was
intended to be an additional structural provision to keep the federal
government within its prescribed boundaries. '364 The simultaneous enactment
of state laws permitting warrantless arrests for traveling on the Sabbath,
Sabbath-breaking, 365drunkenness, swearing, nightwalking, and practicing
"'crafty science"'
tell us very little about the Framers' intent regarding the
Fourth Amendment. These laws no more form a constitutional baseline for
assessing what the Framers meant when they wrote and adopted the Fourth
Amendment than they provide a constitutional baseline for assessing the
meaning of the First Amendment's Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses.
Of course, this reasoning does not establish that a warrantless arrest for a
non-violent misdemeanor in fact violates the Fourth Amendment. My point
here is two-fold. First, the Court in Atwater was wrong to demand that Fourth
Amendment litigants provide particular evidence that the Framers sought to
limit the precise conduct under review. That interpretation mistakenly distills
362 RAKOVE,

supra note 312, at 316. But cf Thomas, supra note 48, at 180 (noting that

the "anti-Federalists who pressed the Bill of Rights to limit federal power saw state
legislatures and state courts as the protectors of citizens and not as threats").
363 RAKOVE,

supra note 312, at 313.

364POWE, supra note 359, at 48 (discussing the Framers' intent in drafting the First
Amendment); see also Thomas, supranote 48, at 179 ("A fair reading of the text and history
suggests that the writing and ratification of the Bill of Rights manifested a hatred and fear of
the federal government.").
365 See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 337.
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the Fourth Amendment's rich and complex history into a per se rule. Only a
select few Fourth Amendment claimants-such as a person subject to a general
search or arrest warrant, an unannounced police entry into a private home, or
possibly a nocturnal police entry-can satisfy the burden Atwater requires.
Second, the fact that some early Americans had an expectation that
constables would possess the power to affect a warrantless arrest for a nonviolent misdemeanor in limited circumstances does not demonstrate that the
Framers intended the Fourth Amendment to establish that expectation as the
law of the land. The reach and meaning of the Fourth Amendment for our
society should not be constrained by the expectations of those who lived in
1791.
Writing in 1981 about methods of constitutional interpretation,
Professor Sandalow asserted that "[a]n understanding of the current meaning
of... clauses limiting governmental power, depends far more on familiarity
with the history of the twentieth century than of the latter years of the
eighteenth. ' 366 Because decisions on the scope and meaning of the Fourth
Amendment are often "inescapably judgmental," 367 and because Fourth
Amendment "values" do change over time, the expectations of eighteenth
century Americans about non-controversial search and seizure issues should be
constitutionally irrelevant. 368 In light of these concerns, it is clear that
Terrance Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation, 79 U. MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1050
(1981); cf Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). Professor
Lessig thoughtfully discusses the differences between what he refers to as a "one-step
originalist" and a "two-step originalist," arguing that by applying the "original text now the
same as it would have been applied then" and "ignoring changes in context," the one-step
originalist "changes rather than preserves meaning." Id. at 1183, 1188. The two-step
originalist, however, with his familiarity of "both the culture from which the source text
derives and the culture to which the target text will apply" strives to "make the meaning of
the current application equivalent to the meaning of an original application." Id. at 1185,
1194 (citations omitted).
367 Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 353-54 (commenting that "the fourth amendment is not
clear" and that "[t]he work of giving concrete and contemporary meaning to that brief,
vague, general, unilluminating text written nearly two centuries ago is inescapably
judgmental"). As with interpreting other provisions in the Constitution that protect
individual freedom, interpreting the Fourth Amendment often involves value judgments.
See Sandalow, supra note 366, at 1052 ("Decisions under the equal protection clause have
always been heavily value-laden, and necessarily so, since value premises (other than the
values of 'equality' and 'rationality') are necessary to the determination that the clause
requires." (citation omitted)); cf Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 668 (1966) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (asserting in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment that "there is room for
reasonable men to differ as to whether or not a denial of equal protection or due process has
occurred, and the final decision is one ofjudgment").
368 Cf FALLON, supra note 11, at 18 (claiming that it is "not obvious that the framing
generation understood the meaning of the Constitution's general language as necessarily
fixed by contemporaneous applications, rather than by more ultimate conceptions of how
'the freedom of speech,' for example, would best be defined in light of unfolding
experience" (citation omitted)).
366
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Atwater's use of history to assess the legitimacy of a constitutional claim is not
the traditional, 369 or even the best way to interpret the Constitution. 370
CONCLUSION

When resolving Fourth Amendment disputes, the Supreme Court has stated
that history is the departure point for every case it will decide. 37' This
statement has proven to be untrue. The Court's search and seizure
jurisprudence of the past two Terms reveals that the Court typically ignores the
origins of the Amendment, even in cases where history may be pertinent to the
issue before the Court. In cases where the Court does consider history, its
selective use of historical analysis often distorts what appear to have been the
Framers' conceptions about the Fourth Amendment. Even in a case like
Wilson, in which the Court purported to rely on history, the Justices were not
recovering what Professor Davies has termed "the original Fourth
Amendment. '372 The time has come for the Court's analytical double-talk to
end. The Court should stop discussing the historical origins of the Fourth
369 If the Court were to confine constitutional rights to the expectations of those who
lived during the time the document was written, America would be a very different place.
For example, as noted above, those who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment did
not expect that the Equal Protection Clause would require the abolishment of racially
segregated public schools. See FALLON, supra note 11, at 139 n.7 (commenting on the
unintended ultimate effect of the Equal Protection Clause); Michael J. Klarman, Brown,
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L.
REV. 1881, 1884 (1995) ("It is inconceivable that most-indeed even very manyAmericans in 1866-68 would have endorsed a constitutional amendment to forbid public

school segregation."); MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961 196-216 (1994).
Moreover, if the

expectations of early Americans were controlling, state and local governments today would
be free to establish state-sponsored religions. See FALLON, supra note 11, at 140 n.9.
Fallon argues that:
For one thing, it is questionable that the Fourteenth Amendment was originally
understood as making the Bill of Rights, and thus the Establishment Clause, applicable
against state and local governments at all. For another, it appears to have been a
historical purpose of the Establishment Clause to protect state establishments of
religion from congressional interference.
Id.(citations omitted).
370 FALLON, supra note 11, at 21 (noting that "a number of important nonoriginalist
Supreme Court decisions have actually helped to promote political democracy").
37 See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300 (1999).
372 The phrase "Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment," comes from the title of
Professor Davies' article, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9. With
respect to the Justices' failure to follow the history of the Amendment in a beneficial and
authentic way, see id. at 742 n.561 (stating that the use of history in Wilson was "only
pretense"); Davies, Law-And-Order Originalism, supra note 9, at 265 (asserting that "the
originalist claims that have appeared in recent search and arrest opinions that endorsed
broad police powers generally have lacked historical authenticity").
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Amendment.
Ignoring the roots and development of the Fourth Amendment will
undoubtedly be costly, as we can learn much from the Amendment's origins.
History indisputably teaches us that the discretionary powers conferred by
general warrants and writs of assistance were despised by the Framers, and this
is often relevant to modem cases, particularly when the Court must decide how
much discretionary search and seizure power governmental officials may
wield. 373 But other aspects of the Amendment's history either present a
muddled picture of the Framers' expectations or do not address many of the
Fourth Amendment issues currently confronting today's judges. Despite these
ambiguities, the Court has adopted an abridged version of the Amendment's
history that compliments its modem reasonableness standard. This truncated
view of history simply does not reflect the Framers' thoughts about the Fourth
Amendment's constitutional meaning. In sum, the Court has ignored the
complexity of the Fourth Amendment's origins, 374 and as a result has denied
itself and the nation the potential benefits of a comprehensive historical
inquiry.

313 Cf Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, supra note 9, at 747-48.

According to Professor Davies:
Although the expansion of modem law enforcement authority undoubtedly reflects a
degree of institutional self-aggrandizement, it also reflects a sustained judgment that
some degree of discretionary authority is necessary for effective policing. The issue is
not whether we will allow any discretionary police authority, but how much
discretionary authority will be conferred and in what circumstances.

Id.
114 Cf Cloud, supra note 62, at 1746 (noting that the greatest contribution of William
Cuddihy's work is that "he confirms that the complexity of the Amendment's history defies
the simple generalizations-whether glib or thoughtful-that lawyers, judges, and legal
scholars have made about the lessons history teaches about the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment" (citation omitted)).
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